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The World of Courtroom Technology
By Fredric I. Lederer

Abstract
The rapid adoption of courtroom technology is changing the nature of both litigation and adjudication. We are
potentially on the road to a virtual courtroom, an adjudication in which none of the participants need be in the
same place and which could result in the demise of the courtroom as we know it. This article reviews the nature of
the burgeoning courtroom technology revolution, posits some of the critical legal, human, and policy questions
that accompany it, and ponders the desirability of a "virtual courtroom."
As trial reconvenes, the participants blink into existence on the computer monitors that supply the only
commonality applicable to them. Judge, counsel, parties, witnesses, and jury appear in virtual form on each
person's monitor. Necessary evidentiary foundations are laid by witnesses with distant counsel's questions;
documentary evidence is not seen by the jury until received by the court. A real-time, multi-media record
(transcript with digital audio, video, and evidence) is available instantly. Sidebar conferences are accomplished
simply by switching the jury out of circuit. During the interim, the jurors can head for their kitchens or for restroom
breaks. The public can follow the proceedings on the Internet. Should critical interlocutory motions be argued, the
appellate court can directly monitor the proceedings.
Or
Having decided to fight his traffic ticket, Mark Calvin schedules his court appearance with the court's automated,
World Wide Web docketing system. As the scheduled time approaches, he realizes that he won't make it to the
local shopping center computer kiosk, so he uses his boss's office computer and joins the virtual courtroom.
Judge and traffic officer appear in windows; each is in a different location. The officer and Calvin present their
versions of events, illustrating any points with free hand sketches captured by their
Introduction
We are living in a technological age that is increasingly dependent upon computers and related information
technology. Although still scarcely more than fledgling steps, commerce is increasingly Web-based, (3) political
discussions occur in cyberspace, (4) and matters of acute national interest such as Independent Counsel Starr's
report are released first via the Internet. (5) Although prime time media remains television based, the major
networks, most notably CNN, have significant web presences. The nation is sufficiently computer dependent that
the Year 2000 bug suffices for some to see the end of civilization.
At the same time, the legal system is changing. Most of the nation's lawyers, judges, legal administrators, and
support personnel have long ago adopted word processing, electronic legal research, time and billing programs
and, increasingly, varying forms of case management software. Electronic filing, already in use in a number of
courts, is a topic of discussion in numerous jurisdictions. In Los Angeles and Indianapolis, motorists can pay their
traffic fines by dialing in to Internet sites and providing credit card information. (6) Some California offenders can
go to traffic school on-line. (7) There is even a virtual law firm. (8)
Yet, until recently, technology largely sidestepped the courtroom. Such technology as was present usually came in
the form of ad hoc, case-specific hardware that was brought into the courtroom for use in a single case and was
later removed. Although ad hoc technology use is still common, albeit even frequent, the current trend is toward
integrated high technology courtrooms. Depending upon definition, as of April 1998, the Courtroom 21 Project had
verified eight qualifying state facilities and approximately thirty-two federal ones. More have come on line since
then.
The advent of high technology courtrooms and, in Australia, investigatory hearing rooms, (9) has raised the

question of "virtual trials." If we assume, as we shall later in this article, that a "virtual trial" is a trial in which all the
participants and all "information," (i.e., evidence, opening statements, closing arguments, and, in jury trials,
instructions) are conveyed in real-time electronically to each other as appropriate, a virtual trial, and the virtual
courtroom necessary to support it, are still somewhere in the future. Yet, if by "virtual" one means that significant
portions of the evidence, including remote witness testimony, is conveyed electronically, such trials and
courtrooms are in fact already here.
The common characteristic of all high technology courtrooms is the capability to present evidence electronically,
which can be transmitted to anywhere in the world. Further, an increasing number of courtrooms include the
capability for remote, two-way testimony via video- conferencing. (10) Indeed as of April, 1998, the Administrative
Office of the United States Court reported that at least thirty-four federal district courts, encompassing sixty
separate locations, are or will soon be equipped for video- conferencing. (11) At least twenty-nine states use or
authorize videoconferencing for various proceedings, (12) and a few have implemented remote, forensic expert
laboratory testimony. (13) Even appellate courts are using videoconferencing. The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits use videoconferencing for oral arguments, (14)
and in United States v. Salazar, (15) the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces heard a case in the
Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin Courtroom with two of the court's five judges appearing via videoconferencing
from different states.
Given that judges, counsel, and witnesses need not be in the same location (16), the possibility of trials in which
no physical commonality is present is obvious -- and real. (17) Today's technology is such that we are
unintentionally on the road to at least the capability for, if not the actuality of, virtual trials and virtual courtrooms.
(18) Whether the result is a desirable destination, an unfortunate detour, or a one-way trip to disaster is far from
clear. What is clear is that we are on our way.
This article reviews the technology that is pointing us in the direction of virtual trials and courtrooms and then
ponders the legal, human, and policy questions raised by that possibility. The article is informed by the experience
and views of a number of technologically pioneering jurists and court administrators, who were interviewed in
preparation for writing it, as well as the insights gathered by the Courtroom 21 Project staff over a six-year period.
The article also includes the tentative conclusions of the first Courtroom 21 International Working Conference on
Technology Augmented Litigation. As has been oft expressed in the Courtroom 21 Project, this article assumes
that technology should be only a means to an end and not an end unto itself. The question then is not what we
can do with the technological options available to us, but rather for what purposes may we wish to use technology.
We will address initially the current courtroom technologies that provide the foundation for virtual courtrooms,
pause to review the lessons of today's integrated high technology courtrooms, and then move to a consideration
of what may be tomorrow's virtual courtrooms.
First, the "Paradigm"
High technology courtrooms and technology augmented litigation are reflections of the understood, but rarely
voiced, nature of legal practice. Legal practice, especially litigation and adjudication, is a highly sophisticated form
of information management.
The courtroom is a place of adjudication, but it is also an information hub. Outside information is assembled,
sorted, and brought into the courtroom for presentation. Once presented, various theories of interpretation are
argued to the fact finder who then analyzes the data according to prescribed rules (determined by the judge
through research, analysis, and interpretation), and determines a verdict and result. That result, often with
collateral consequences, is then transmitted throughout the legal system as necessary. The courtroom is thus the
center of a complex system of information exchange and management. (19)
Ultimately, it is the fact that lawyers and judges deal continuously with "data" that impels high technology
courtrooms and which makes virtual courtrooms possible.
The Foundation for the Virtual Courtroom: Today's Developing Technologies
Case Management, Electronic Filing and Related Information
The courtroom does not exist in a vacuum. The cases that are tried in the courtroom begin with the filing of
pleadings, often continue with motions and supporting documents, and only finally arrive in the courtroom

complete with often copious evidence.
Modern case management requires systems that help courthouse personnel manage the flow of cases. Cases
must be kept current and case information must be routed to a variety of critical administrative personnel and
judges. (20) Managing the case effectively requires managing the information that gives rise to the case. In
traditional terms that requires storing and routing the originals and copies of what can be huge amounts of paper,
especially in a major urban courthouse. If only to achieve the largest money and time economies possible, one
can expect court administrators to seek more efficient control over paper by reducing it to electronic data. This
gives rise to electronic filing.
In its most basic form, electronic filing, now being experimented with around the nation, (21) either permits or
requires that pleadings be sent electronically to the court. Pragmatically, a good system will also provide for the
dispatch of copies to all other necessary parties. (22) Although electronic mail easily permits the simple
communication of information it is entirely inadequate from a systemic point of view. From the court's perspective,
efficiency requires that case name, parties, attorneys, and other data be supplied to the court in an identifiable
manner that permits the court to capture that specific information for case management purposes. At the same
time, current court rules require that the legal documents themselves be submitted in highly specific formats.
Appellate rules, for example, may mandate fonts, type sizes and set page limits. One can assume that nearly all
material written by lawyers is produced using computers. Unfortunately, each software package is unique, and
none of the available options can be converted perfectly into another's format. Accordingly, any electronic filing
system must accommodate the differing formats. Even if this is done successfully, one must then cope with two
critical complications: some documents that must be filed were not produced using a computer and must therefore
be converted into an electronic image, and pro se litigants cannot be expected to file personally by computer.
In reality, the electronic filing situation is more complicated. Not all lawyers use computers, and a perfect
electronic filing system must either require the largest degree of such filings possible, by coercing the lawyers to
participate electronically, or cope adequately with what could be a significant amount of paper. Once electronic
information measures are implemented, the likely court solution is to take any paper that is traditionally filed and
have the court turn it into electronic data. Members of the public without electronic access must then be assisted
by court staff when they wish to take advantage of their right to public access to the filed materials.
The collateral consequences of electronic case management, filing, and related systems are of great potential
importance. Scheduling a hearing, for example, will require resort to one or more calendars. The judge's calendar
will be critical, but if the judge isn't assigned permanently to a given courtroom, a courthouse calendar will be
required as well. At the same time, efficient scheduling should involve access to all other hearings involving the
same counsel. (23) At the very least, these needs impel judicial access to more sources of scheduling information,
and such access should be available from both chambers and the bench. When electronic filing is implemented as
well, calendaring information is augmented by the actual pleading and associated legal documents, all in
electronic format. Once this information is available and electronically accessible there is little or no reason to limit
it to court personnel. Trials are open to the public, and the status of filed cases, including scheduled public
hearings, are matters of public and media interest. Further, the content of filings can be of enormous interest to
other parties and the public. This is especially true of litigation involving many parties such as the breast implant
and tobacco cases. Once the basic information is available, absent special circumstances such as sealed filings,
there is little reason not to make it generally available, and the World Wide Web has provided a simple mechanism
for doing so. (24) The immediate, world-wide, electronic access to fundamental scheduling information,
accompanied by the images of the actual documents, creates a virtual clerk's office, and more. For example,
Delaware's Chancery Court is going online. By the end of the year, lawyers, judges and consumers should be able
to dial up the business court's Internet Web site to get copies of lawsuits, briefs, and settlement documents. (25)
Should the judge respond to pleadings with electronic court orders without in-person hearings, a virtual pretrial
court session exists as well.
The currently evolving virtual clerk's office clearly permits faster, more efficient, and cheaper operation. Physical
storage costs can be almost entirely eliminated and transmission and notification times are nullified by electronics.
At the same time, public access becomes truly meaningful, largely for the first time. Unfortunately, these
improvements come at some cost. Technology adoption and training expenses are significant, especially if the
number of computer illiterate court and bar personnel is substantial. Once embarked on the technological roller
coaster, the court will almost certainly find itself faced with questions of periodic upgrading of both software and
hardware, and the risk of having one or more of its systems "orphaned" as the cut-throat world of technology
competition eliminates companies. Compatibility may be a major problem, not only among different systems -- will

lawyers have to deal with different filing systems for each court -- but also within the court if later upgrades prove
to be incompatible with prior versions of the software. The impact on the public is far from trivial as well. Although
those people who have access to computers, the Internet, and computer skills will have immediate access to what
is taking place in their courts, those without such advantages will be dependant on the clerk's staff, which is,
ironically, the present situation. (26) One other result will occur, however -- a sharp change in the effective privacy
of court documents and court information.
The general public has always had legal access to court records dealing with title to real property. Any interested
person can check the status of any parcel of real estate, including any associated liens. As a practical matter,
however, this right has been of little value to most. Even if they were aware of the fact that such records exist and
are public, they lack the knowledge of how to find specific records. Few would bother to ask the clerk's assistance
without special reason. Electronic data has changed the situation, however. Some years ago LEXIS began to
carry such records as part of its database. It took only seconds for me to obtain a description of a friend's house
on the other side of the United States, along with a property tax valuation; I even discovered other real estate
owned by my friend of which I was unaware. Similarly, at least one newspaper reporter has confidentially reported
to me the ability to access court database information of allegations that members of the public had committed
highly disagreeable offenses. Before electronic records were made, this information existed but was effectively
impossible to search. Now, not only do you not need to travel to the courthouse, Internet searches can retrieve the
data almost immediately, and you do not need specialized legal knowledge to obtain it. Electronic court
information thus makes real and important changes in the actual degree of privacy that exists in the court process,
changes that diminish individual privacy. This result likely would be replicated in the event of easily accessible
virtual trials. Some years ago, Art Buchwald wrote a satirical column (27) in which a fictional commuter rail
passenger refused to pay for a ticket because his train car was not heated or clean. The conductor summoned the
police and the commuter was forced to defend himself in court. The trial was televised. The trial was brief and the
commuter was acquitted of disturbing the peace. Subsequently, the commuter found that a surprisingly large
number of people had viewed some or all of his case, but that few remembered the details. Instead, they all
ascribed major criminal violations to him, eventually resulting in the loss of his job and an offer extended to him as
an "ex con." Although today's significantly increased media coverage of trials calls into question Buchwald's
tongue-in-cheek view of the impact of television and the average citizen's perception and memory, his basic
premise of a change in individual privacy seems sound. Like court records, most trials are effectively private; Court
TV and the other television stations and networks have limited carrying capacity. Today's easy data accessibility
suggests that virtual trials which could be followed at home via Web-television or computer might replicate the
colonial period in which the general public had easy access to cases and regularly attended trials, if only for
entertainment.
Legal Briefs and Other Legal Materials
Legal research is a critical component of any lawyer's practice, and it is increasingly unthinkable that American
lawyers could function successfully without access to electronic legal materials. LEXIS and Westlaw are
mainstays for most lawyers. They have brought to attorneys vast and ever current libraries available originally
through dial-up telephone connection and now via the Internet. Similar materials, albeit not as current, are
available in CD-ROM publications. Firms such as Matthew Bender supply sophisticated electronic form books on
disk that further automate legal practice.
Access to electronic legal materials has changed the nature of law practice. It has created virtual law libraries and,
through on-line access, has hastened the advent of the virtual law office, one which exists wherever the lawyer
may happen to be. Within the high technology courtroom, counsel and judge have immediate electronic access to
nearly all legal authorities. Further, and critically, when the courtroom is properly equipped, counsel and judge
may display their authorities to each other as an important adjunct to legal argument.
Given the increasingly electronic nature of legal materials, it should be no surprise that lawyers are now creating
electronic, multi-media legal briefs. The famous Fish &amp; Richardson Yukiyo appellate brief (28) was a multimedia CD-ROM brief that contained, on one disk, counsels' brief, hypertext-linked legal authorities, transcript, and
evidence. The brief also included all of the necessary documents one would expect in the Appendices, along with
diagrams, video clips, and part of a video deposition, with audio. Although the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit granted the opponent's motion to strike the CD-ROM in favor of a traditional presentation, the
Court laid out procedures for later high technology briefs, and such have been received. (29) Companies such as
West, Lexis, and Pubnetics, among others, now produce or assist in the productions of such briefs.
The advent of electronic legal briefs carries at least three significant implications. The first is that appellate practice

may be changing. These briefs are far more comprehensive than their traditional equivalents, and, if used in an
appropriately wired courtroom, they permit extraordinary electronic visual interchange of legal authority among
judges and counsel. (30) The second implication stems from economics. Electronic appellate briefs are in part
compilations of materials generated at or presented during trial. To ensure the most inexpensive preparation
possible, those underlying trial matters, including transcript and evidence, should originate at trial as digital
information so that the "data" can be reproduced quickly and cheaply in the brief. Lastly, these briefs can be filed,
exchanged, and presented electronically, laying the ground work for a virtual appellate courtroom.
Court record
Courts of record in the United States require verbatim records of their proceedings. In general terms, courts can
be divided between those which use stenographic or stenomask court reporters to generate the record and those
which use some form of electronic voice recording. The record is of importance to both trial and appellate courts
and to the attorneys and parties involved. (31)
Recent developments in court record technology show how quickly we are developing the infrastructure
necessary to a virtual trial.
Most court reporters have been using modern technology for many years, generating computer assisted
transcription. The most capable of court reporters can generate "real-time," transcript, a contemporaneous,
substantially accurate rough draft of the transcript that is made available to judge and counsel on their personal
computers. Until recently, only stenographic reporters could produce such a transcript. In 1997, a Louisiana
company, Audioscribe, produced the first trainable, speech recognition, real-time system which permits
stenomask reporters to produce real-time transcript, albeit at a level not yet equal to better stenographic
reporters. Real-time is inherently digital. Transcript results when the court reporter's key presses or voice finds a
match in the computer's database; absent such a match, symbols which can later be translated are produced.
Because the transcript is electronic, it can be transmitted over telephone lines or, as is increasingly done, can be
published to the web for real-time viewing.
The alternative to court reporter-produced transcripts is electronic recording: audio or audio/video. Although
analog tape-recorded audio is the most inexpensive recording technology, more useful digital audio is now
beginning to replace the older technology. Digital audio has significant improvements over analog, including
easier storage and, often, text annotations that can be used as a limited search index. (32) Like real-time, the
digital nature of the audio permits transmission to remote locations, either via ISDN or other heavy bandwidth
connections, or via the Web. Video records, traditionally videotaped proceedings, have generated more
comprehensive electronic records because they include picture and sound; indeed electronic recording inherently
supplies information to an appellate court that is not available though a traditional transcript alone. (33) However,
video records have not generally been accepted as direct court transcripts in any state other than Kentucky. (34)
Accordingly, when a party wishes to appeal, the video record, as is also the case with an analog or digital audio
record, must be transcribed. (35)
The same technology that is used to make the court record is often used before trial for discovery purposes.
Videotaped depositions have been used for many years in the courtroom either in lieu of in-court testimony or for
impeachment of a witness. Combining digital audio and video with a computer-assisted transcript produces a
synchronized, multi-media transcript. When such a deposition is played in court, ordinarily from a CD-ROM disk,
counsel can present the audio, video and scrolling electronic text transcript. When published to the World Wide
Web, the same technology provides a comprehensive real-time record. This virtual "deposition attendance" is an
important marker on the road to the digital courtroom.
The same technology that permits multimedia depositions also can be used to create multi-media court records.
Because digital video takes up a huge amount of electronic storage space, such a court record has not really
been commercially feasible - and the Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin Courtroom is believed to be the only
courtroom in the world that has a functioning multi-media court record system that combines audio, video, and
synchronized real-time transcript. Changing technology, however, should address this in the next few years. (36)
At the same time, Internet and network technology is quickly changing our expectations of data access and
availability. Working with an Australian company, the Courtroom 21 Project is in the process of completing a
system which combines the reporter's real-time transcript with digital audio, (37) along with all evidence, and
relevant case management and electronic filing data, thus providing an immediate, electronically disseminated
record.

In the past, the availability of a comprehensive court record that includes voice inflections and body language has
raised questions of how the appellate system might be affected. Traditionally, the appellate courts give deference
to the evaluation of demeanor evidence by the trial court. (38) A comprehensive multi-media record necessarily
forces one to ask whether appeals might become in effect de novo appeals. (39) Although the sheer number of
cases alone argues against this result, it can hardly be gainsaid that it is likely that an appellate court would feel
far freer in its review if it had available nearly everything that had happened below. (40) Although concern about
the scope of appellate review is valid and perhaps even of increasing importance, the fact of such an electronic
record also emphasizes our ability to take legal events that occur during trial and instantly record and transmit
them. Accordingly, if all evidence can be given electronically , the core components of a virtual trial are present.
Evidence and Information Presentation
In general
Litigation is, of course, a dispute between or among parties. Resolution of that dispute requires that the parties,
usually through counsel, prove necessary relevant facts and then persuade the fact finder, judge or jury that when
the applicable law is applied to the facts, a verdict in their favor should result. To prove the appropriate facts,
counsel present evidence. Evidence normally consists of witness testimony and actions, (41) documents, charts,
photographs or other images, and physical objects. When counsel make opening statements or closing
arguments they technically do not present evidence. Instead they can be viewed as presenting information to the
judge and jury, information, which like evidence, consists of verbal statements often supplemented by use of
documents, charts, photographs or other images, and physical objects. Perhaps the core element that
characterizes technology-augmented litigation and high tech courtrooms is the use of technology to present
evidence and counsel-originated information. The effect of electronically-displayed evidence can be seen in
human terms in recent Australian litigation:
Downtown at 55 King Street, two of Victoria's biggest ever civil trials are in full swing on adjoining floors of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal building, specially leased for the purpose by the Supreme Court.
Both cases are engaging in documentary warfare on an epic scale, but ride the lift from one floor to another and
the picture is strikingly different.
On the first floor, the court is wading knee deep through the paper trial tracking the collapse of the Pyramid
Building Society.
The courtroom is crowded with shelves overflowing with files - 500 per party. Every time a document is mentioned
there's a mad scurry as everyone looks through shelves and leafs through pages looking for the right piece of
paper.
Downstairs, where investors in the failed Estate Mortgage are trying to win back some of the $ 1 billion lost by the
company in the eighties, the atmosphere is strangely serene for a court ploughing its way through more than
30,000 documents (pared down from the original 1.5 million).
The room is dominated by computers, rows and rows of them. The smattering of files barely takes up a single
shelf. The only sound punctuating the drone of the presenter is the occasional click of a mouse button. (42)
Technology can be installed temporarily for a specific trial or permanently in an integrated, high technology
courtroom. Most technology augmented evidence and information presentation originates with document
cameras, computers, and computer white boards. (43) Evidence and information can be displayed on large
television screens, jury monitors, front or rear projection screens, or any combination thereof.
Although the distinction is an uneasy one, as will be seen herein, we sometimes can legitimately separate the
electronic display of evidence and information from questions surrounding the use of electronic evidence per se.
The most commonplace, and simple, way of presenting material in court via technology is to use a document
camera. Often known under the name of the two most common vendors, Elmo and DOAR (Communicator), a
document camera is simply a vertically mounted TV camera aimed down at a flat surface. The lawyer puts a
photo, document, or object on the surface, and the camera instantly displays the image on the television(s) or
monitor(s) to which it is attached. The camera has two buttons permitting easy and fast closeups. . . .

A document camera is normally connected to one or more televisions by a simple cable. However, some vendors
often an RF (radio frequency) add-on that permits the camera to transmit its information to a TV connected
receiver without wires. This capability can be critical in convincing a judge to permit counsel to bring the
equipment into the courtroom.
When a person using the basic document camera wishes to point to an area or point under the camera, he or she
can do so with a pointer, pen or pencil, or a finger. An electronic pointer can be added, however. A device such as
a DOAR Illustrator or a "Beckler" permits the use of a light pen on a pad or on an attached computer monitor
image. .. . (44)
In its simplest form the document camera converts documents and other physical images and objects into
television or computer images. Through the use of a document camera coupled to appropriate display devices,
counsel can display larger-than-life images immediately, increasing comprehension and sharply decreasing the
time necessary to acquaint a jury with the evidence. Further, as the document camera is portable, it can be
transported among courtrooms as necessary.
Although the document camera is perhaps the most basic form of electronic evidence presentation, in most
respects it is symbolic of all other forms of high tech evidence display. I have elsewhere suggested that
"Electronically produced evidence can be defined as that evidence which originates as digital material or which is,
regardless of origin, produced in court solely as digital material." (45) If the image produced by the document
camera is what is offered in evidence, rather than, for example, the paper document placed under the document
camera, there is no difference between the perceived evidence and evidence that originated in digital form. (46)
Utility
Electronically-produced evidence that is displayed on a television or computer monitor is perceived as an
electronic image. It is also amenable to electronic transmission, storage, and, if need be, replay. Limited
Courtroom 21 Project experimental work shows that jurors are highly satisfied by the electronic display of
documents. (47) Indeed our experimental laboratory trials tell us that jurors want evidence to be presented visually
to the greatest degree possible. Although they proclaim no preference for electronic visuals over traditional charts,
photos, and the like, much of today's exhibits can best be presented electronically.
Judges who preside over high tech courtrooms invariably are proponents of the technology and claim that in
addition to speeding trials, the technology provides better justice because it increases juror comprehension.
Indeed, in 1998 The Judicial Conference Committee On Automation and Technology released the results of their
assessment of certain technologies used in federal courts. On video evidence presentation, defined as
simultaneous display of evidence to judge, jury, and court via individual monitors, 83% of judges surveyed felt the
technology helped them manage court proceedings better and 90% of jurors surveyed felt that they were able to
see evidence clearly, follow attorney presentations, and that the video display was an easier way to present
certain evidence. (48)
Anecdotal evidence in this area point to two reasons for better comprehension on the part of jurors: 1) the use of
video evidence presentation makes cases more lively and engages the jury more and, 2) display on individual
monitors allows jurors to read at their own speed without embarrassment. (49) Our own experience in Courtroom
21 laboratory trials bears this out. In our surveys, jurors preferred visual presentation of evidence on individual jury
monitors.
Though better comprehension by jurors is surely a benefit to attorneys, some lawyers have pointed out other
benefits to using video evidence presentation systems. Time that might normally be spent sifting through evidence
and deciding what will go into evidence books is saved since everything can easily be stored and organized on a
CD-ROM. An attorney might also look more organized and competent to a jury when carrying a CD-ROM into
court and clicking through exhibits rather than repeatedly digging through piles of paper. (50)
Anecdotal evidence from the United States and Australia also suggests that trials can be shortened by at least 25
to 25% by the use of electronically-presented evidence. Yet, efficiency is not the primary goal of our legal system - hopefully justice is. Justice requires as accurate a result as possible.
A best evidence problem?
Electronic images of evidence that began as or which exist as non-digital physical evidence are not the same as

the image. "Electronic visual images of original non-digital evidence nearly always differ in some particulars from
the; 'hard-copy;' originals. Current technology is such that even if a totally accurate image of the original is made
or captured, the displayed image will differ in color and resolution." (51) These differences are rarely of
significance, however. In most circumstances the color balance difference between the paper document and the
electronic image used in court is irrelevant; the information content of the text is what is important. (52) If the
electronic display of evidence does not inherently raise troubling concerns, we must ask whether the use of
electronic evidence and information is itself problematic.
Electronic evidence usually consists of images of documents, most frequently electronically scanned documents,
photographic or other visual images, computer produced animations, and panoramic or 360 degree photographs.
(53) Audio and video recordings are also of potential value, and as previously noted, we are increasingly using
media-media depositions at trial.
Alteration and fabrication
The most frequently raised question concerning electronic evidence is the possibility of alteration through
undetectable digital skullduggery. To the best of our knowledge this is technically possible. Whether it is or should
be a real concern is by no means clear.
Given sufficient funds and time we believe that the technology exists to permit at least a reasonable possibility of
altered or totally fabricated electronic evidence, be it still images, digital audio, or even digital video. Much the
same could be true of the possibility of fabrication of traditional evidence, however. It is not clear that the risk of
seamless electronic forgery is substantially different from the risk of a document prepared by a highly skillful forger
-- at least once we accept that such a thing is possible. The evidentiary system's authentication demands are
relatively slight and generally are met simply by the foundational testimony of a "witness with knowledge." (54)
What is supposed to suffice to save us from forgery are not evidentiary rules so much as the adversary system's
ability to meet evidence with credible adverse evidence, including witness testimony. (55) What the risk of
alteration does suggest is the need for early pretrial discovery and disclosure of electronic evidence. (56)
Unfair prejudice
Opening statements and closing arguments lend themselves to use of key pieces of evidence, often illuminated by
counsel's own interpretation of their meaning. Counsel thus are likely to show evidentiary images to the judge or
jury. In addition, as counsel are trying to make clear and persuasive points, counsel may wish to use computerbased presentation media, "slide shows" (57) Electronic slides permit the creative use of electronic text points,
often enriched by clip art images, charts or photographs. (58) Such slides raise the possibility of intentional
insertion of "visual bias," the equivalent of semantically "loading" the spoken or written message with words
carefully chosen to create a specific psychological reaction. In one early Courtroom 21 Project experiment,
plaintiff's counsel used a slide show that was designed to bias jurors against the defense. In a civil wrongful death
case in which the plaintiff had died in a hotel fire, plaintiff's slides were set against an angry crimson backdrop and
designed , among other matters, to subtly suggest a tombstone inscription. The presiding judge, Judge Roger
Strand, of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, quickly sustained the defense objection. Of
greater interest, however, was the jury's reaction. When surveyed after the laboratory trial, the jury reported easy
recognition of counsel's intent and a significant degree of anger at the effort.
That it is possible to slant exhibits or slides through careful use of text, fonts, colors, and images is hardly news.
The law has long been concerned with evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. Whether slide shows or computer
animation, the same concerns and rules apply to electronic media as to gruesome photographs of murder victims.
That the jury in our experiment also reacted adversely to counsel's intent to create bias is reassuring; such
attempts may always backfire, whether high tech or not.
No one can confidently predict that electronically produced or displayed evidence will be trouble free. More
accurately, the most one apparently can hope for is that no new problems will be created, just the same old
problems in new guises. But, if electronic evidence and information are not especially problematic, the fact that we
can present evidence usefully and successfully by electronic means unavoidably methods that evidence can be
presented in a virtual courtroom.
Jury deliberations
Electronic marking of a video image is transitory. No record of it exists after the image is altered or erased. When
the image needs to shown to a jury again or put in the appellate record, the system should be connected to a
video printer and appropriate images printed as the image is changed. This suggests a greater and more troubling

concern: how does the jury deal with electronic evidence during deliberations? Anecdotal reports from visitors to
the Courtroom 21 Project suggest that at present when a jury wishes to review technology presented evidence, it
is most often returned to the courtroom and the evidence replayed there. Sometimes, especially if the technology
is straightforward, a court officer plays the evidence in the jury room. High technology courtrooms raise the
troubling question of how the jury should review the full panoply of technology-dependent evidence. At present
there is no adequate answer to this. Specific pieces of evidence are not troublesome, but in a case with a realtime transcript, and hundreds or thousands of images, perhaps augmented by recordings of remote testimony, the
problem is acute. One component of the problem is technical: we must ensure that the jury receives only admitted
evidence. The other is a combined matter of people and technology. How can we ensure that jurors can easily find
and play the necessary evidence when they may be functionally illiterate, let alone computer illiterate? Another,
more substantial question, also presents itself. Jurors now have only limited access to the evidence. What would
happen if they could recall and debate all of the evidence presented in the case? Would a verdict result? Would it
take less or more time? Would deliberations be improved? There are no answers to these questions at this time,
experimental work is critically needed in the area.
Remote Witness Testimony
Our discussion of electronically presented evidence is incomplete. Witness testimony is a critical component in
most trials, and our evidentiary and information discussion did not address the presentation of live witness
testimony. A virtual trial is not possible without that capability.
Video depositions have been commonplace in courts for some years (59). Judge McCrystal experimented in Ohio
years ago with videotaping testimony and then playing the edited tapes to the jury in lieu of live testimony. (60)
Recorded testimony lacks, however, the immediacy of live testimony and deprives us of the ability to use
testimony from witnesses who are not in the courtroom. Videoconferencing supplies that capability, and
videoconferencing for remote first
appearances and arraignment has become commonplace throughout the state courts. (61) Indeed, at least
twenty-nine states use or authorize videoconferencing for various proceedings. (62)
Satellite-based videoconferencing supplies near perfect audio and video but is too expensive and inaccessible.
(63) Current ISDN (high capacity data line) "dial-up" videoconferencing permits relatively inexpensive, two-way,
high-quality remote testimony from anywhere in the world.
As implemented in the Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin Courtroom, a 40 inch diagonal SONY TV/monitor has
been installed immediately behind the witness stand. When remote testimony is to be taken, the participants in the
courtroom see the life-size image of the remote witness The remote witness sees a multi-frame TV image of four
specific portions of the courtroom, the speaker, and a comprehensive image of the entire courtroom. The witness
can effectively see everything. And, of course there is two-way audio. Direct and cross-examination proceed as
customary. Evidence can be displayed electronically via document cameras, computers, or faxed. (64)
Such testimony is not perfect. Short audio delays that are inherent in the technology prohibit the instant
interruptions common in ordinary conversation. Although video resolution and quality are good, extremely rapid
movement may not reproduce properly. (65) Notwithstanding these constraints, Courtroom 21 Project
experimental use indicates that videoconferencing is highly effective. Four experiments have indicated that jurors
perceive remote witnesses just as they perceive in-court witnesses, neither better nor worse. However, we lack
any experimental evidence that might indicate whether remote witnesses are more or less likely to tell the truth
than in-court witnesses. There are also significant problems with effective administration of the oath; absent a
treaty or special statute, cross-jurisdictional perjury may not be subject to prosecution. (66) Further, transmission
from commercial videoconferencing centers or business surroundings lacks the traditional judicial surroundings
thought to convey the seriousness of court testimony. Notwithstanding this, remote testimony is expanding rapidly.
(67) Begun primarily in Australia's federal court, (68) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now expressly provide
for its use.
In every trial, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken in open court, unless a federal law, these rules, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. The court may, for
good cause shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, permit presentation of
testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location. (69)
Insofar as criminal cases are concerned the United States Supreme Court has accepted when necessary child

witness testimony via one-way video. (70) In what is almost certainly a major harbinger of the future, the Florida
Supreme Court has sustained a robbery conviction based largely upon the two-way video testimony of
complainants testifying from Argentina. (71)
The Court decided that in order for the testimony to be received despite Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
limits "the procedure must (1) be justified, on a case-specific finding, based on important state interests, public
policies, or necessities of the case and (2) must satisfy the other three elements of confrontation--oath, crossexamination, and observation of the witness's demeanor." (72) Having decided to sustain the conviction, the Court
added as a matter of policy,
We are mindful of the possible difficulty in determining when the satellite procedure should be employed. We are
also aware of the possibility that such a procedure can be abused. Therefore, we are establishing the following
guidelines to aid in making this decision. The determination is not simply a mathematical calculation, based on the
number of alleged public policy interests or state interests. Rather, the proper approach for determining when the
satellite procedure is appropriate involves a finding similar to that of rule 3.190(j) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 3.190(j) provides the circumstances under which and the procedure by which a party can take a
deposition to perpetuate testimony for those witnesses that are found to be unavailable. . . .
Thus, in all future criminal cases where one of the parties makes a motion to present testimony via satellite
transmission, it is incumbent upon the party bringing the motion to (1) verify or support by the affidavits of credible
persons that a prospective witness resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court or may be unable to
attend or be prevented from attending a trial or hearing and (2) establish that the witness's testimony is material
and necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Upon such a showing, the trial judge shall allow for the satellite
procedure.
. . . However, some important caveats exist in regards to the oath, cross-examination, and observation of the
witness's demeanor. First, an oath is only effective if the witness can be subjected to prosecution for perjury upon
making a knowingly false statement. . . . To ensure that the possibility of perjury is not an empty threat for those
witnesses that testify via satellite from outside the United States, it must be established that there exists an
extradition treaty between the witness's country and the United States, and that such a treaty permits extradition
for the crime of perjury. . . .
We also acknowledge that possible audio and visual problems can develop with satellite transmission. It is
incumbent upon the trial judge to monitor such problems and to halt the procedure if these problems threaten the
reliability of the cross-examination or the observation of the witness's demeanor. (73)
Harrell demonstrates that in Florida the fundamental concept of remote testimony in criminal cases has been
accepted. The decision of the United States Supreme Court to refuse to grant certiorari (74) has no precedential
impact, of course. The absence of review suggests however either that the Court has no significant problem with
the Harrell result or wishes further development of the practice and law before ruling on the procedure.
That use of this technology will increase can be seen simply by looking at the nature of current installations. The
one area of substantial American use of videoconferencing has been remote first appearances or arraignments in
criminal cases. (75) No one has made, to the best of our knowledge, an accurate inventory of the number of
courts using such systems. The number of installations is, however, at least in the hundreds -- if not far greater. At
the same time, the federal courts have experimented with remote appearances by incarcerated § 1983 plaintiffs.
(76) It was only to be expected that the companies selling these systems would attempt to expand their sales via
systems designed for other uses, and that is now occurring. Jefferson Audio Video, Inc., for example, has installed
remote witness testimony locations from which police forensic chemists can testify. During the 1998 Australian
Institute of Judicial Administration Conference in Melbourne, the State of Victoria demonstrated a two-way
connection to its forensic laboratory, illustrating how a forensic chemist, in a lab setting, could testify without
coming to court. At the same time, the large number of courts and jurisdictions that have invested heavily in this
technology are already seeking additional uses to justify their capital investment. (77)
Remote appearances by judges, counsel, and others
The courts are using videoconferencing for far more than witness testimony. Police,for example, have sought
arrest warrants by two-way television. (78) The courts have shown a greater interest, however, in remote
appearances by counsel and judges, an area now developing rapidly.

The Second Circuit (79) has provided remote locations for counsel appearances. The Court first experimented
with live, remote video oral argument in a case in October, 1996. The Court then formally adopted remote video
oral argument in the Spring of 1997 and established video links in four locations (Albany, Mineola, and Rochester,
New York and Hartford, Connecticut). The Second Circuit encompasses New York, Connecticut, and Vermont,
and the Court sits in Manhattan, so the advent of remote oral argument has proved a significant benefit to
attorneys who could travel all day for a ten-minute argument before the Court. (80) The circuit executive has noted
that the judges and most attorneys do not feel there is an advantage to appearing in person in the Court. (81)
Victoria, Australia, has shown the ability in an emergency to bring in a substitute judge via videoconferencing from
hundreds of miles away within an hour when the scheduled judge was forced from the bench by family necessity.
(82) The Courtroom 21 Project hosted the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces on March 15,
1996. The Court heard United States v. Salazar (83) in the McGlothlin Courtroom, with two of its five judges
appearing by separate videoconferencing systems.
The use of technology to assist those with hearing, vision, mobility or other problems is of particular importance.
Internet-based videoconferencing proved to be critical in one such case. Relying on the decisions in Harrell, supra
and United States v. Gigante, (84) and taking them a step further, a New Jersey Superior Court judge granted a
plaintiff's application to testify and observe the trial from his apartment via a videoconferencing link over the
Internet. The plaintiff, who is paralyzed from the neck down and breathes with the aid of a respirator, stated that
he was too weak to travel from Chicago to New Jersey for his medical malpractice suit against several New
Jersey doctors and that the cost and time involved in enabling him to travel would be prohibitive. The judge
agreed, and to allay the defense attorneys' fears that the plaintiff could be coached in his testimony, he appointed
a retired judge to monitor the plaintiff in his apartment during the proceedings. In a letter accompanying the order,
Judge Anthony J. Sciuto stated:
Why should this court, or any court, fear to tread into an area of advanced technology? To permit the plaintiff to
testify via Real Time Video teleconferencing will enable the plaintiff to have the benefit of viewing the trial, and
testify live via the Internet where he would otherwise not be present in court due to his medical condition. . . .
Permitting this plaintiff to view the trial and testify via the Internet clearly supports our Court's public policy to
permit handicapped individuals access to our courts. This, in my opinion, is an essential and appropriate step for
modern technology to assist in permitting all people equal access to justice. (85)
The plaintiff did testify via the Internet and the case was settled after that testimony. The same technology permits
broader access by the public to trials than ever before. (86)
The assumption that lawyers might be especially reluctant to appear via video appears questionable. The Ninth
Judicial Circuit of Minnesota is currently engaged in a pilot videoconferencing project. All courthouses in this large
and predominately rural circuit are linked on a T-1 network, and use of videoconferencing is encouraged in civil
cases (court rules forbid the use in juvenile and criminal proceedings). Judge James R. Wilson notes that he finds
videoconferencing very beneficial and would like to see the restrictions on its use lifted in his circuit. He also notes
that attorneys have embraced it because it was not at all uncommon for them to travel three hundred miles for
appearances. There have even been proceedings in which participants have appeared from three remote
locations. Judge Wilson does point out one drawback. Some attorneys in his circuit want to appear via
videoconferencing for every matter and accommodating their remote appearance in a simple matter can take
more time (for setting up and shutting down equipment) than a physical appearance in court would. (87)
Remote appearances and testimony are the key elements in "virtual trials" and "virtual courtrooms." That we are
likely to proceed further in these directions might also be extrapolated from the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Harrell:
Our Court is mindful of the importance of today's decision. Yet, we are also mindful that our society, and indeed
the world, is in the midst of the Information Age. Computers are the norm in American households and
businesses; an infinite amount of information is available at our fingertips through the Internet; and satellite
technology allows us to travel the world without ever leaving our living rooms.
The legal profession has also benefitted from these technological innovations. Legal research that once took
hours or days is now available in seconds through computer and Internet databases. Clients can reach their
attorneys anywhere in the world through the use of cellular and video innovations. The list goes on and on.

Indeed, our very own Court takes pride in the recent technological advancements that have been made. Oral
arguments before the Court are broadcast live via satellite throughout the state. These same arguments can be
viewed online, along with the parties' briefs. The Florida Supreme Court Website has received worldwide acclaim
for opening up the courthouse doors to the general public. All of these steps provide greater access to the judicial
system, which in turn increases public trust and awareness.
That being said, it becomes quite clear that the courtrooms of this state cannot sit idly by, in a cocoon of
yesteryear, while society and technology race towards the next millennium. Fortunately, the courtrooms of this
state have not been idle, nor are they speeding at a reckless pace. Recent changes in the courtroom have
included the use of audiotape stenographers as well as video transmission of first appearances, arraignments,
and appellate oral arguments, just to name a few.
We recognize that there are generally costs associated with change. Nevertheless, technological changes in the
courtroom cannot come at the expense of the basic individual rights and freedoms secured by our constitutions.
We are confident that the procedure approved today, when properly administered, will advance both the access to
and the efficiency of the justice system, without compromising the expectation of the safeguards that are secured
to criminal defendants.
Our nation's Constitution is a living document that has stood the test of time and change. This point is exemplified
by the fact that our Constitution is still viable today--some two hundred-plus years after our country's birth. There
was no way the founders of this nation could have foreseen the innovations that would take place throughout our
country's lifetime--changes that, up to this point, have included advances in communication, electricity, train,
airplane, and automobile transportation, and even space exploration. Nor can we predict today the changes yet to
come. But we can say with certainty that our Constitution, as well as this great nation, can endure any future
changes while at the same time ensuring that individual rights and liberties will be upheld. (88)

The Integrated High Technology Courtroom
Introduction and Definition
Thus far, we have reviewed many of the courtroom technologies that already are taking hold in our legal system.
The whole is at least the sum of its parts, and sometimes the whole is different, and perhaps even greater.
Accordingly, we now turn to what happens when these disparate technologies are brought together in today's
integrated high technology courtrooms.
All true high technology courtrooms are characterized by one core capability, a multi-faceted, technology-based
evidence presentation system. Ordinarily, such a system will consist of at least a television-based document
camera and a display system able to display not only what is placed under the camera but also, and critically,
computer output. The computer input may stem from one or more installed desktop units, from a notebook
computer supplied by counsel and connected temporarily to the display system, or a combination thereof. The
display system may consist of televisions, computer monitors, or large front or rear projection systems. Usually a
combination is used. An evidence display system does not alone create a true high technology courtroom,
however.
The Courtroom 21 Project definition of a high technology courtroom also requires a high technology court record
system and the capability for remote witness testimony by two-way, high-quality videoconferencing. In the past,
the Courtroom 21 definition assumed at least significant computer-based research and information retrieval
capabilities from the bench. That is now part of the Project's formal definition as well.
In short, today's high technology courtroom is the hub of a substantial amount of electronic information
interchange. Although not yet a true virtual courtroom, it is apparent that key aspects of a virtual courtroom are
present in the current high tech courtroom. The use and effects of the electronic information exchange that
characterize even today's technology augmented courtrooms raise substantial questions, all of which would also
accompany any discussion of virtual trials and virtual courtrooms.
Troubling Questions
Any evaluation of today's high tech facilities necessarily raise the following questions:

z
z
z
z
z
z

Do they work?
Do they improve the administration of justice?
What is necessary to create and operate these facilities?
To what extent, if at all, do they disadvantage some parties, counsel, or others?
What are the collateral consequences of high technology litigation?
Are technology augmented litigation and high technology courtrooms consistent with traditional humanistic
goals?

These are far from unimportant matters; our future depends upon their answers. Deeply concerned about the
direction that our legal systems are traveling, largely without planning, in September, 1998, the Courtroom 21
Project, with the support of the William &amp; Mary Bill of Rights Institute and the American Bar Association
Sections on Litigation and Criminal Justice, conducted an international Working Conference on Technology
Augmented Litigation. The threshold question to be considered was whether large scale technology use at trial
was desirable or hurtful. Attended by judges, lawyers, administrators, support professionals, and experts in the
area, the Working Conference concluded that:
z
z
z
z

The adoption of courtroom technology was ongoing and likely unstoppable;
Courtroom technology was desirable;
Known problems involving electronic incompatibility of evidentiary files required resolution through creation
or adoption of standards;
It is too early in the adoption of technology to attempt to regulate its use in any thorough fashion but that
liberal use of pretrial notice and disclosure is at least helpful in avoiding problems.

Upon the unanimous request of the attendees a follow-on meeting has been scheduled for March, 2000. The
Working Conference's conclusions support continued use of technology, but emphasize critical questions
concerning high technology courtrooms.
Do they work?
The technologies, and the courtrooms that use them, work and generally work well. Indeed there is an amazing
amount of interest in obtaining these technological capabilities throughout the United States and much of the
world. This is not to say that specific technologies or products do not sometimes present difficulties. In general,
however, the technologies work. Further, although careful scientific studies are necessary to validate these
conclusions, it appears clear that technology use can, and often does, improve administrative efficiency, shorten
trials, and improve fact-finder comprehension of evidence. Insofar as we can tell, however, courtroom technology
is not itself sufficient to overcome inadequate evidence. Indeed, we suspect that all technology does for an
inadequate lawyer is make that inadequacy even plainer.
But, potential technological success is not the same as real success. Anecdotal evidence and internal experience
gathered by the Courtroom 21 Project before and during the Working Conference predictably yielded the perhaps
obvious, but none the less sobering, conclusion that most lawyers are disinclined to use courtroom technology.
Insofar as we can tell, the high tech courtrooms that are the most successful are those in which judges have not
only provided training for the lawyers, but also required that counsel use the technology on a mandatory basis.
From our interviews and inquiries we conclude that successful high tech courtrooms require that their judges be
enthusiasts. Bench-bar partnerships are also essential for success, but it is unclear whether they are sufficient.
We are now seeing the first law school students for whom computer use is routine and self-evident. We would
have thought that such familiarity and expertise would be sufficient to result in a desire to use courtroom
technology. Although that has helped, it too has not been sufficient.
Beginning with the Class of 1999, the William &amp; Mary Law School added mandatory courtroom technology
training to the Legal Skills curriculum, effectively making it a graduation requirement. As a result of small group
hands-on instruction during the 1997-98 academic year, we found that the optional use of our courtroom
technology during student trials went up sharply. We initially concluded that small group hands-on instruction was
the key to increased technology comfort and use. This seemed quite logical: once student lawyers overcame their
lack of familiarity and possible unease and discovered how simple technology use could be, we expected, and
received, sufficient quantitative improvements in use. Unfortunately, it appears that the situation is more
complicated than originally presumed. Many of those same students are now taking elective Trial Advocacy

during which they must try jury trials in front of a sitting federal or state judge. There is less use of the Courtroom's
technology in those trials than we would have expected. It may be that the determining factor is that the faculty
teaching the course seldom use the technology, (89) but we had anticipated greater motivation on the part of the
students.
The training situation is still more complicated. At present, a number of high technology courtrooms such as that of
United States District Judge Donald Walter supply counsel with orientation training. That training is
understandably short and primarily oriented towards equipment operation. The Courtroom 21 Project-preferred
litigator training curriculum takes about twelve hours, covers a wide range of associated topics, and integrates
equipment operation into trial practice instruction. As observed by Susan Hobbs, Courtroom 21 Project Associate
Director for Research &amp; Publications, (90) if courts or firms suggest that more than a few minutes of hand-on
training is necessary to profitably use high tech evidence presentation options, a major time and psychological
barrier to such use may be erected. At the same time, supplying only a few minutes of training erroneously and
misleadingly suggests that that is all that is truly necessary.
We conclude that lawyer willingness to use courtroom technology may be the determining factor in its success.
(91) Such willingness may not remain a problem, however. Setting aside those situations in which the court
mandates such use, thereby resolving the problem, increased recognition of the value of the technology for
winning one's case is likely to impel its adoption by lawyers. If nothing else, the adversary system should drive
adoption as counsel increasingly will be afraid that failure to use technology when one's opponent may do so is an
unacceptable risk.
Improving the administration of justice
What "improves" the administration of justice is clearly a question of judgment. Initially, decreasing the time and
cost necessary to resolve a dispute would appear to be in the interests of judgment. So too should be
improvement in fact finder comprehension which should lead to improved accuracy in result. Assuming that these
results do in fact flow from the use of courtroom technology, (92) problems may yet remain. Most civil or criminal
cases are resolved by settlement. At least in the abstract it is possible that decreasing the cost and delay now
inherent in adjudication in most jurisdictions could be counter-productive. On one hand, some degree of delay is
probably necessary for many litigants so that they can recover from the initial emotional commitment to their
ultimate goals and achieve a somewhat greater degree of detachment, permitting a more realistic case appraisal.
(93) On the other hand, current delay and cost themselves impel settlement. If barriers to trial are lightened it may
be that more cases will go to trial. This, of course, is not necessarily bad -- "Justice delayed is justice denied." If
we are now discouraging meritorious cases from trial, we should eagerly embrace increased efficiency even if it
causes an increased caseload.
Technology-augmented litigation has been embraced by many trial lawyers largely because the lawyers believe
that it enhances their ability to persuade juries. Although we ought to prize and encourage anything that enhances
fact finding accuracy, we should be deeply concerned about any technique that increases the risk of a verdict
justified more on emotion than fact. At present there is reason to believe that technology creates special risks of
such an unacceptable result. However, further experimental work - and monitoring of real cases - in this area
would be desirable.
What is necessary to create and operate these facilities?
Creation of high technology courtrooms requires:
z
z
z
z
z
z
z

careful systems analysis, including candid evaluation of the way that trials are conducted in that court
courtroom-specific design
technology acquisition
installation
operation
training
maintenance.

Although adequate funding is obviously necessary, the primary expense in installing these facilities is for the
actual wiring -- which can be very costly if the wiring must be retrofitted into an existing, historical facility. When

properly designed, maintenance should not be significant; courtroom technology should be straightforward and
unlikely to fail
Some form of maintenance is clearly necessary. Normal maintenance is likely to consist of such things as
adjusting monitors and correcting altered switch settings or finding where someone has unplugged equipment. If a
monitor fails, someone must be able to replace it with a spare. More sophisticated maintenance, perhaps including
an outside maintenance contract, is necessary for less likely but more serious failures. (94)
Operation and training are hard to quantify. When designed pursuant to the Courtroom 21 Project's requirement of
simplicity, the courtroom should be subject to operation by judge (95) or deputy clerk; no special expert should be
needed. Training, however, is likely to be an ongoing necessity in the short term. That responsibility must either be
transferred to the bar or institutionalized in the courthouse staff. Any installation that requires new staff should be
scrutinized carefully; high technology courtrooms should decrease costs, not increase them.
To what extent, if at all, do they advantage or disadvantage some parties, counsel, or others?
One of the most fundamental questions raised by technology augmented technology, and high technology
courtrooms in particular, is whether they potentially disadvantage key participants in the process. The threshold
question is whether the cost of equipment, and the case-specific preparation that requires office access to
technology, effectively prohibits small firms, solo practitioners, and pro se litigants from technology use. Courtroom
technology potentially includes not only inexpensive straightforward methods of evidence presentation such as
document cameras, but possibly costly document scanning, and almost certainly expensive methods such as
computer animation production. Choosing to proceed via the expensive route is a gamble; even if the case is won
the results may not justify expense. In 1995, for example, the California Court of Appeals vacated a jury's award of
costs to a prevailing party because it deemed "high-powered computer support" to not fall within the definition of
litigation expense. (96) The court focused on a controversial aspect of high tech litigation, noting that "[i]f costs are
routinely awarded for high-powered technology, most parties will be unable to litigate." (97) The goal, of course, is
to make litigation affordable; certainly not more costly. But even the basics potentially cost money that a lawyer or
litigant may not have.
Ad hoc technology use raises the financial question squarely. If we assume that both parties to a trial have
access, albeit distinctly uneven access, to trial technology the problem does not appear to be acute. Modern
computer technology has gone a long way toward equalizing solo practitioners and large law firms. Although the
imbalance remains substantial, it is far narrower than it was before technology. A solo practitioner with computer
technology can conduct wide ranging research, prepare and file pleadings and motions, and prepare high
technology evidence presentations and exhibits in a fashion incalculable a generation ago. In this circumstances,
the differential in ability is arguably quantitative and not qualitative. Further, as United States District Court Judge
Kathleen O'Malley has noted, many lawyers from small firms and solo practitioners are more computer-adept than
lawyers at large firms because they have to rely on themselves and not consultants or support staff. (98) The real
question is what happens when one party has technology and the other has no meaningful access. (99)
An indigent client represented by a solo practitioner who is opposed by an affluent client who has retained a large
firm is at a serious potential disadvantage if the large firm uses technology. Even if the large firm provides the
courtroom technology and either voluntarily, or under judicial direction, permits technology use by the solo
practitioner, the solo practitioner may lack either the training or the outside access to technology to permit effective
use. Of course, this is hardly a new dilemma. Unequal legal representation is a constant in our system, and terribly
mismatched counsel do not justify relief unless counsel for one party is legally inadequate.
However, even if the mismatch of technology versus non-technology is simply a new form of a continuing systemic
deficiency, that does not in itself justify dismissing the problem. Once at trial the question of fairness really
becomes one of equal access to courtroom technology. The institutional high technology courtroom is one answer
to this dilemma. If all parties are supplied with a courtroom that comes complete with necessary technology rather
than just a display system for evidence or presentations created by the litigant's own equipment, the technology
imbalance is in large measure redressed. When the court provides a high tech forum it is also providing a level
playing field. The only issues left are the lawyers' inclinations and know-how, and this is largely a matter of
preparedness. Thus the question is raised, can lack of technology or the training or willingness to use it constitute
"inadequacy"?
Ethically and legally, a lawyer must be competent. The definition of competence is open to debate, but surely we
can agree on some key points. For example, is a lawyer who cannot perform basic legal research "competent"? If

not, are we fast approaching the day when a lawyer who cannot perform electronic research will not be
competent? As our society becomes more technologically based, our definition of "competence" must adjust.
Given such realities I believe that both law firms and law schools must consider how to deal with the impact of
legal technology.
At the most obvious level, I would argue that to be "competent," litigators must know what technological
assistance is available to them and how to use it. (100)
It seems unlikely that current standards would define an inability or refusal to use courtroom technology as ethical
inadequacy or legal malpractice. But if courtroom technology continues its expansion into the court system it is
increasingly likely that technological proficiency will be such a requirement. Of course, if technological prowess is
not yet required, how can we expect the vast multitude of lawyers to cope with a virtual courtroom? The adversary
system itself may be at least a partial answer. In a recent trial in Maryland, a defense attorney objected,
unsuccessfully, to the prosecutor's use of a computer slide show during closing argument. He admitted to
reporters that the enhanced closing argument made his own effort appear "slipshod in comparison." (101)
Even if inability to use technology on the part of a lawyer does not constitute an ethical problem we are left with a
sobering question of public policy. If technology assists a litigator, and thus the represented party, technology is at
least a significant factor in representation. What happens when trial includes a pro se litigant who either has no
ability to use technology or lacks the access to it? The Courtroom 21 Project approach has been to encourage
courts to install basic evidence presentation systems, complete with computers, rather than to just provide
connections for laptop computers to the display systems. The Project's rationale is that this affords the pro se
litigant or solo, non-computer supported practitioner with at least the opportunity to present a case electronically.
This position was ultimately supported by the Courtroom 21 Working Conference because it attempts to redress
unequal access to justice. Unfortunately, although well intentioned, it is probable that the position is a makeweight
with little practical value. Absent personal and continued access to technology it is unlikely that a litigant or
practitioner will be able to successfully use even basic court-supplied technology. This is a qualitative difference
and is, or should be, troubling.
Although technology clearly has presented us with a sobering question of access, it has also brought blessings to
those who suffer from hearing and other problems. The hard of hearing who can read can serve as jurors,
counsel, and judge thanks to real-time transcription, including real-time displayed as closed captioning on motors.
Infra-red systems help those who can hear, but not well. The degree to which technology can assist people with
other concerns is unclear at present, but is it clear that substantial benefits are available. (102) The Courtroom 21
Project recently added a medical doctor to its staff as Assistant Director for Adaptive Technologies and
Ergonomics. It is our hope that research in this area will point the way to assisting many of those now
disadvantaged.
What are the collateral consequences of high technology litigation?
One of the difficulties in evaluating the impact of high technology litigation and courtrooms is that their collateral
effects are so unclear. We believe that when used properly technology can improve efficiency and save trial time.
On occasion, however, the overall situation might be viewed as a balloon; press in at one point and some other
location on the balloon will bulge out. It may be that the savings in trial time is offset by increased lawyer pretrial
preparation. The cost savings at trial may be offset by the cost due to document scanning. We simply don't know
enough about the overall economics involved.
At the same time, human questions are pressing. If technology use is to be commonplace, how many lawyers and
judges will be unable, or unwilling to adapt? Is the process of trying a case electronically different in important
ways from traditional modes? When the Courtroom 21 Project conducted a two-day program for the ABA Litigation
Section's Trial Evidence Committee, a number of lawyers felt that document display on jury monitors created a
form of psychological distance from those documents.
Are technology-augmented litigation and high technology courtrooms consistent with traditional
humanistic goals?
Courts serve two primary functions in our society: they resolve disputes, (103) and, to the degree possible in a
system conducted by fallible people, they deliver justice to litigants. Courts are preeminently human creations.
People view the courts as places in which justice is administered by the people's agents. The normative model,
accepted by most of the nation, (104) is a jury sitting as fact finder and verdict giver, a jury that applies judge
explained law to the facts as determined by the jury. Trial lawyers apply their understanding of human psychology

in an attempt to convince judges and jurors of their case interpretations; the judge and jury determine facts by
filtering human evidence through their own experiences. Interestingly, courts have shown themselves hostile to
non-blood typing/DNA probability evidence in part because it is thought to remove humanity from adjudication.
(105)
From the comments of visitors to the Courtroom 21 Project, the ultimate threat that technology-augmented
litigation is thought to aim at the judicial system is loss of humanity. Traditional litigation places the lawyer at the
focus of fact-finder attention. Papers are shown to human witnesses in the courtroom; charts are placed on
easels, and lawyers add emotion to logic in closing arguments. Even the tribulations of the participants, hours
wasted by waiting witnesses and inactive jurors, are classic human complaints. Verdicts themselves are
sometimes the ultimate example of human conflict as jurors, sometimes literally "locked up" together, struggle to
reach resolution, if only to terminate their forced togetherness. Enter technology- augmented litigation; enter the
high technology courtroom. Evidence consists primarily of electronic images; counsel rarely leave the centralized
litigators' podium or the counsel tables. Remote first appearances and arraignments, common in hundreds of
courts, result in the accused seeing the judge who determines conditions of release and other critical factors by
two-way television, perhaps leaving a nagging question in the mind of the accused: if they really cared, wouldn't
they bring me there? Important testimony at trial is increasingly given by faces in televisions, albeit live interactive
faces, and we are beginning to see more and more remote judges and counsel. Could it be that as we improve
efficiency we risk minimizing the humanness that has characterized our trials? Absent experimental work that has
yet to be conducted, we cannot even hazard a guess as to the reaction of jurors (106) or the general public. The
views of the surveyed judges and of the attendees of the Courtroom 21 Project Working Conference on
Technology-Augmented Litigation are quite positive about technology use. Conceding lack of sufficient
experimental data in the area, we might posit the following:
z
z
z

technology use per se is not troublesome;
should technology use increase past an (unknown) point in any given case, jurors, observers and perhaps
legal professionals may become uncomfortable;
if highly expansive technology use becomes sufficiently commonplace to penetrate the national
consciousness, the courts might lose the degree of general acceptance that currently results in acceptance
of most verdicts, if the changing and increasing nature of national technology use does not itself change
general societal expectations.

Assuming the above, it is now appropriate to turn to what may well be the next major step in high technology
litigation and courtroom: virtual trials.
Tomorrow's Possible Virtual Courtrooms
Inasmuch as no true "virtual courtroom" exists as yet, one can define the concept with an unusual degree of
liberty. We will assume for purposes of this article that a true virtual courtroom is not a physical location but rather
is the interchange of high-quality audio, video, text, and graphical information among trial participants without
concern, except for jurisdictional requirements, for the physical location of those participants.
The beginning of Web-based interactive instruction makes it clear that a virtual court based upon exchange of text
(107) is now possible. Indeed, David Johnson, founder of Counsel Connect, has proposed resolution of certain
disputes entirely via the Internet. (108) We assume that this type of information exchange is per se insufficient as
a substitute for the traditional form of courtroom adjudication. This is based upon the assumption that most people
would reject as inaccurate or unjust decision making that is not accompanied by contemporaneous viewing of
witnesses, jurors, counsel, and judge. (109) Certainly, the commercial rush to incorporate audio and video into the
Internet suggests the importance of those communication components.
Given our assumption that live video is necessary, we will define a true virtual courtroom as one in which all of the
participants can be in different physical locations. All trial components, including opening statements, evidence,
closing arguments, instructions, and jury deliberations occur via electronic information exchange. The courtroom
itself exists only in the data exchange network. The true virtual courtroom is, therefore, a cyber courtroom.
The true, "virtual courtroom" would be a courtroom in which participants, all of whom might be located physically
elsewhere, would appear together electronically with each one perceiving the other, and the courtroom, as if they
were all in the same physical location. This concept is not a new one - at least in the world of science fiction. Many
American television viewers would think quickly of the Enterprise's "holodeck" in the various Star Trek series.

Such a concept has more reality than one might expect. Virtual reality now exists via "CAVE," Cave Automated
Virtual Environment. "A CAVE is about the size of a walk-in closet. Step inside, put on 3-D glasses, and suddenly
you become part of a computer animation . . . (110) "There are more than 100 CAVEs at universities, government
facilities, and companies . . . . They help engineers see 3-D full-size models of cars and enable scientists to walk
inside models of single molecules." (111) This would yield a courtroom that exists only in a data network, but one
which to all human senses, and thus psychologically, would be experienced as a physical courtroom with all
participants present. Such a courtroom exists only in science fiction, however, - at least for the mid-term future.
Today's virtual cyber courtrooms must be far more limited in scope. They will permit participants to share the
litigation information and to intercommunicate, all while remaining physically distant. This defines today's virtual
courtroom.
Technology: How Close To a Useful Virtual Courtroom Are We?
Our review of the now existing courtroom technologies leads to the unavoidable conclusion that all of the
technological pieces necessary to create a virtual courtroom are either in use now or can be expected to be
commercially available in the immediate future. To the degree that a significant technology question exists, it
concerns the switching and distribution system that would be necessary to "construct" or "carry" a virtual
courtroom. Positing a set-up in which all participants can view each other and the evidence requires a system that
can receive those images and distribute them as constrained by evidentiary and procedural rules. At present the
Internet would be the obvious mechanism, with the "courthouse" acting as central control. An Internet-based
system would also answer the need for a "public" trial; even today, huge numbers of people can concurrently view
a given Web site. However, today's normal Internet access provides insufficient bandwidth to carry sufficiently
high quality video, to say nothing of the many different images required. At the same time, rapidly improving
Internet access, including the new Internet II, suggest that the bandwidth issue is only a matter of time.
The technology problem is not the theoretical availability of specific mechanisms which, combined, could create a
virtual courtroom. The real problem is the limited access to the technology. Our legal system exists for all people,
and we cannot and must not exclude from it those who lack the financial means to afford personal technology or
those who for a variety of reasons cannot use technology. A true virtual courtroom presupposes easy access by
all potential trial participants, including jurors. Although technology is sweeping the United States, such ubiquitous
technology access seems unlikely, if not impossible, any time in the near or intermediate future, at least for jury
trials.
To define the virtual courtroom in such a purist fashion as to define it out of existence is to go to far, however. The
core of the problem is the jury. The goal of having every participant appear remotely from a location of that
person's choosing, is simply not likely to be practical any time soon. But, a partial virtual trial could be
accommodated and a virtual courtroom created if the jury were to be required to meet in person; or if jurors
needing technology support could report to local courthouses (112) for an electronic connection to the
proceedings.
This discussion has been focused thus far on jury trials. Although a jury trial is the normative rule in the United
States, most of our cases are not jury trials; they are bench trials of varying importance. Freed of a need for a jury,
virtual trials and courtrooms become much easier to institute.
Bench trials, including traffic court and administrative proceedings
Most trials and hearings in the United States are without juries. Administrative, civil, or criminal, they are
characterized by judge, counsel, witnesses, parties, and associated court personnel and support staff. Although
perhaps distressing to some members of the bar, attorneys could be required to use remote appearance facilities.
Witnesses and parties could appear either from their own remote, camera-equipped computers, or use public
terminals located in high traffic areas such as shopping malls. In some administrative cases, the claimant may
even be the only witness. In the simplest criminal case, that of minor traffic infractions, a virtual courtroom would
be easy to create and likely would be regarded as a blessing by most. Rather than having to take substantial time
from work or other pursuits to challenge a traffic ticket, defendants could use remote equipment to do so. Police
officers could appear remotely from their station or other appropriate location. Given its electronic nature and the
probable lack of the need for a text- based transcript, electronic recording of the proceeding would make a
sufficient record. In the event of conviction and sentence, fines could be paid by electronic funds transfer or credit
card. The same would appear to be equally true of the equivalent of small claims court or any other relatively
straightforward proceeding. Criminal cases in which incarceration is a possible sentence present obvious
problems: jailing a virtual image of a convicted defendant is hardly likely to be satisfactory.

Appellate courts
Creation of a virtual appellate courtroom and trial of a virtual appeal present no significant problems and could be
readily done today. Use of a multi-point videoconference would suffice today; creation of a multi-participant system
in which all parties could see each other at all times would require a more sophisticated electronic structure, and a
more expensive one if high-quality video were required, but that too is possible. Further, as is true of the
Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothin Courtroom, such a virtual facility would also permit interchange of electronic
legal authority, including briefs or components thereof. In short, a virtual appellate courtroom is readily possible,
and as we create facilities in which one or more of the participants appear by videoconferencing we are now
experimenting across the world with the first, limited, versions of one.
Other Technology Problems
It is a rare visit to the Courtroom 21 Project that fails to brings up the question of electronic security. Ordinarily
such a concern raises two different matters: the risk of digital alteration or fabrication, already addressed, and the
possibility of electronic eavesdropping, up to and including penetration and alteration of the court's electronic
records. Electronic eavesdropping is theoretically possible and in some high profile cases must be considered to
be a meaningful threat, just as "hacking" is an ever present risk to every network, even if it is only intended as a
prank. It seems unlikely that this is a threat that cannot be dealt with adequately by careful system design.
Technologists have learned a great deal about physical and data security. Those lessons and common sense
should be sufficient -- if implemented.
Legal Problems
State constitutions, federal and state statutes, and court rules all potentially limit or prohibit virtual trials. All of
these can be amended, however. The most difficult source of applicable law to amend is obviously the United
States Constitution, and accordingly a cursory legal review should focus on that.
Any virtual trial will engender at the very least all of the current problems usually associated with high technology
courtrooms. If remote testimony by a prosecution witness implicates Sixth Amendment confrontation concerns
now, a trial in which all government testimony were to be electronic and remote would obviously pose a more
demanding problem.
At least two other constitutional problems are immediately apparent, however. Under the United States
constitution all trials are public trials, with closure permitted in only narrow circumstances. (113) How can a virtual
trial be "public"? Presumably, the public receives access through the ability to view the proceeding electronically
as it takes place. If a limited original intent/textual interpretation is applied, this may be inadequate, especially if
not everyone has the means for easy and free electronic access. Critically, however, the traditional right to view a
trial has never required the government to enable the public to travel to the courthouse. Similarly, today's
courthouses do not promise sufficient space for all interested attendees, first-come, first- served is usually the
practice. Accordingly, if remote public access is sufficient under the Constitution, there is no current reason why all
interested observers must have access.
At an equally fundamental level is the question of the meaning of the right to a jury trial. Section 1 of Article III of
the Constitution provides that, "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury . . . ."
The Seventh Amendment specifies that "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . ." As it appears certain that a "jury"consisting of
individuals who do not hear the evidence clustered physically together and, more importantly, do not deliberate
together physically is potentially very different psychologically from a traditional jury, it may be that the Constitution
would block virtual juries absent waiver by the appropriate parties. Similarly, "due process" is sufficiently vague
that the Court could decide that it prohibits involuntary virtual proceedings.
Human and Systemic Questions
Ultimately, all of the critical questions that grow out of adjudication are human ones. We can assume technological
adequacy, sufficient funds for equipment purchase, maintenance, and operation, but we cannot assume sufficient
human access, training, or acceptance. We can cope in a variety of ways with access and operation (training).
Acceptance is another matter.
Courthouses have long been considered important if not key pieces of public architecture. They help supply a
sense of solidity. They often convey the role of law in American life. Federal courthouses, designed in past years
sometimes to include post office facilities, often are the primary representative of the national government.
Courtrooms, the center of courthouses, embody the administration of justice. (114) As William Gossett observed,

"If respect for the courts and for their judicial process is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a
society." (115)Virtual courtrooms and virtual trials threaten that sense of place and solemnity. What might virtual
courtroom justice mean to the people?
On the one hand, justice ought to be a real, rather than just a theoretical, right of every person. As the late
Learned Hand observed, "If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandant: Thou shalt not ration
justice." (116) Our imperative must be to increase justice; not decrease it. If we can make the right to justice more
meaningful for those who, faced with the demands of work, family, or limited mobility, cannot easily get to the
courthouse (117)for what is often a brief hearing, justice would be augmented. Yet, on the other hand, American
respect for law and justice, diminished as it sometimes seems to be, (118) might well suffer if the public should
perceive that the process was not fair. Potential deficiencies include not only possible perceived deficiencies in the
truth-finding process, e.g. a doubt either that remote witnesses will tell the truth or that jurors can accurately
evaluate the testimony of such a witness, but also the risk that the adjudicative system could be seen as no longer
human-oriented. I assume that public compliance with legislated societal rules and acceptance of court verdicts
requires at the very least a general perception that justice is done, usually, by the courts. (119) If the public
perceives that justice is not done, whether because of result or process, that general consensus would fail. Even a
cursory glance abroad makes it clear that the American adversary system is not the sole process that can
command general societal acceptance as a fair adjudicative process. Too many other nations have broadly
satisfied populations despite significant and sometimes radically different dispute resolution systems. Yet, the
nature of what is acceptable in a legal system is clearly linked to national culture. The legal system in the United
States is oriented around the concept of a trial in which the accuser/plaintiff presents evidence in open court in the
presence of and subject to searching inquiry by the defense in a process kept reasonably fair by a neutral judge
and resolved, by human beings, judge or jury. The Anglo-American system has rejected adjudications conducted
on the basis of dossiers, creating a hearsay rule that, however riddled with exceptions, creates an institutional
preference for live, in-court, testimony on all sides. It is very much unclear at present whether our population is
prepared to interpret live, electronically conveyed, testimony and related evidence as the human equivalent of incourt testimony. If it is not yet willing to do so, a true virtual trial will be viewed with great suspicion.
We ought not, however, be overly-wedded to current courtroom assumptions. As Chief Justice Burger observed in
a different context, "We should get away from the idea that a court is the only place in which to settle disputes.
People with claims are likely people with pains. They want results and they don't care whether it's in a courtroom
with lawyers and judges, or somewhere else. (120)
It is impossible to predict how this or any other nation will react to a virtual courtroom at a future time when
telecommuting, virtual offices and libraries, and the like have become commonplace. Presumably, when
adjudication uses the same methods employed in the day-to-day activities by most of the populace, those
methods will not be viewed with suspicion. Until then, virtual courtrooms must be viewed with great caution. Of
course, given the current rate of technological change, it may not be long before elements of the public find the
lack of virtual courtrooms to be a visible sign of the law's innate and undesirable conservatism.
So, Where Does This Road Go, After All?
Even the most cursory review of the legal technologies now finding homes in the new, integrated high technology
courtrooms leads one to conclude that virtual courtrooms are not idle speculation. Insofar as the public and media
are concerned, critical components of a number of different types of court proceedings are already virtual. The
direct and cross-examination of the Argentine complainants via satellite-transmitted two-way video in the Harrell
case (121) was in many respects a virtual trial. That testimony was the critical and core prosecution evidence in
the case. True, the rest of the trial participants were in the Florida courtroom, but the core was not there. Had the
defendant been excluded from the courtroom for misbehavior, for example, and viewed both the Argentine
testimony and the courtroom remotely, the virtual trial descriptor would become even more convincing.
As our high technology courtrooms increasingly become technology hubs, and the centers of massive electronic
data interchange, we will get ever closer to true virtual courtrooms and virtual trials. It has long been a Courtroom
21 Project truism, however, that just because we can do something is not itself a justification to actually do it. By
eliminating travel, document transmission delay, and evidence presentation inefficiencies, virtual courtrooms could
save a great deal of money and time, for all of those involved in trial. They could make trials truly public if any
member of the public who wished could "log in" to a trial. And, by making public all of the case evidence, the
media could be expected to improve its reporting. (122) These substantial improvements in operational efficiency
and access are counterbalanced by the risk of the loss of public acceptance of trials as fair and accurate dispute
resolution devices - if the public is unready to accept virtual courtrooms.

The ongoing adoption of courtroom technology is such that we can expect massive systemic change over the next
ten years. Insofar as we can tell at the Courtroom 21 Project, that change is largely unstoppable, a conclusion
accepted by the Courtroom 21 Working Conference on Technology Augmented Litigation. The sea change we are
now undergoing will bring an increasing degree of "virtualism" to our courtrooms and trials. Whether we should in
the short term endeavor to create virtual courtrooms for more than experimental purposes is another matter.
If we are correct and the technologies that will permit true virtual courtrooms are already here in substance, the
real question is one of total integrated use. As we continue down our legal information highway, the road will
increasingly be affected by technology. Remote appearances (123) will increase, and the use of electronic based
fact-finding will become commonplace. We will have the option of taking a number of early highway forks that
would lead us directly and rapidly to virtual courtrooms. The main highway is likely ultimately to take us to the
same destination, but perhaps many years later. Which if any of the forks should we take?
If we are correct in our supposition that full virtual civil and criminal trials would threaten in the short term the
somewhat uneasy national consensus that most American trials are reasonably accurate, fair, and just, we ought
to use virtual courtrooms and trials for those areas in which the public would perceive an improvement in fairness
and justice. Proceedings in which the public's ability to participate meaningfully is enhanced by virtual proceedings
should be welcomed. The move to kiosk and Internet based legal information delivery and limited court services
points the way. If traffic court and similar proceedings, including the vast number of administrative benefit
application hearings can be made easier for the public with a perceived improvement in access and fairness,
virtual courtrooms and hearing rooms will be accepted as valued improvements to the national adjudicative
processes. Such courtrooms should begin as voluntary alternative means to current adjudication. As acceptance
increases and the nation moves to even more technology use, we can expect greater use and dependence upon
virtual courtrooms.
We are on the road to the virtual courtroom. Unless we take an intentional early exit elsewhere, our final
destination is clear. The virtual courtroom is unlikely to replace in the near future our hallowed wood- or marblepaneled inner sanctums, but even those traditional places of law and judgment will see increasing amounts of
virtual evidence and adjudication. We have the opportunity, as we travel, however, to build some high technology
side roads leading to specialized virtual hearing rooms and courtrooms. As we travel on the main highway,
though, we travel with the near certain probability that for many types of cases and in many types of courts and
tribunals our eventual destination will be the virtual courtroom.

1 &copy; 1998 By Fredric I. Lederer. This article was made possible by State Justice Institute Grant Number SJI98-N-136; reproduction by the State Justice Institute is permitted.
2 Chancellor Professor of Law &amp; Director, Courtroom 21, William &amp; Mary Law School. The author would
like to thank his colleagues Susan Hobbs, Courtroom 21 Associate Director for Research &amp; Publications, and
Stacey Rae Simcox, Courtroom 21 Associate Director for Operations &amp; Training for their invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
3 The Internet-based book seller, Amazon.com, may be the best example of a Web-based, full-service retail
establishment of enormous inventory that is accessible to anyone with web access.
4 See e.g., William Booth, Netizen Kane? More Politicians Use Web to Woo Voters, Donors, Volunteers, Wash.
Post, Oct. 17, 1998 at A1, col. 2. Among many other matters, Mr. Booth reports that "46 percent of likely voters
have e-mail addresses." Id. at A10, col. 1.
5 The release by Congress of the Starr Report is only the best example of the use of the Internet and web for
communication. "The California Secretary of State's election Web site had a mind-bending 1.8 million hits in one
24-hour period on the night of the June primary." Id at A10, col. 1.
6 Jan Ackerman, Lawyers Are Going High Tech, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Sept. 20, 1998 at B1.
7 See On-Line Traffic School, (visited Oct. 31, 1998)&lt;http://www.onlinetraffic.com&gt;.

8 Thierman Law Firm doing business as The Virtual Law Firm. The Virtual Law Firm, a California organization,
describes itself as "a bona fide law firm with legal talent collected from around the world. Our attorneys are either
employed by the firm, are members of the firm, or "of counsel" to the firm. We do not have a central attorney
office; rather, we have a central office for administrative purposes only. The attorneys associated with the Virtual
Law Firm are connected via electronic media. This allows us to tap into a talented pool of attorneys who prefer to
work in a remote location or at home." The Virtual Law Firm (visited Nov. 1, 1998), &lt;http://www.tvlf.com&gt;.
9 The Royal Commission Into the New South Wales Police Force hearing room in Sydney is the world's most
technologically advanced legal investigatory facility.
10 If one includes remote first appearance or arraignment systems, the number of equipped courtroom would be
at least in the hundreds, if not the thousands.
11 Jerry Thacker, Assistant Director for Facilities, Administrator Office of the United States Courts, presentation to
William &amp; Mary Law School's Legal Technology Seminar (Williamsburg, Virginia, April, 1998).
12 States include: Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
13 Demonstration by David Green, President, Jefferson Audio Video Systems, Inc. during September, 1998,
annual meeting of the American Judges Association.
14 Videoconferencing Links Federal Courts and Public, The Third Branch 2, 10 (June 1998)
&lt;http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun98ttb/video.html&gt;.
15 44 M.J. 464 (Armed F. 1996).
16 A telephone call from the office has been sufficient for attorney and party presence in some matters for the
Fairfax County Circuit Court in Virginia, which is allowing attorneys to appear via conference calls in motion
hearings and other matters. See Tom Jackman, Court Lets Lawyers Make Some Via Phone, Wash. Post, Jan. 7,
1999.
17 Although complicated, such a trial is not impossible. The Courtroom 21 Project believes that if necessary, and
given adequate funding, it could accomplish such a case in a matter of weeks.
18 And potentially virtual courthouses as well.
19 Fredric I. Lederer, The Courtroom As a Stop On the Information Superhighway, 4 Aust. J. L. Reform 71 (1997).
20 See generally, Technology Information Service, Case Management Systems, National Center for State Courts
Web Site, (last modified Oct. 6, 1998) &lt;http: //www.ncsc.dni.us/ncsc/TIS/casemgmt/case.html. At the same time,
lawyers must manage their own cases and frequently will use both firm and individually based management
software packages. In an ideal world, all of these different software products would interrelate and easily
exchange information. We do not as yet live in that world.
21 Wendy R. Leibowitz, Lawyers and Technology, Courts Electrify Suits, Sparks Fly; New Rules Needed for EFilings, Nat'l L.J. September 7, 1998 at B6.
22 The National Center for State Courts, in collaboration with the West Group, are producing a set of model rules
for electronic publishing and filing. The work is expected to be published soon.
23 Given the multitude of courts and jurisdictions any single lawyer may practice before a single unified calendar
seems fanciful. Accordingly, it is up to counsel to avoid appearance conflicts. Instant access to at least most
potential conflicts would likely be of service to all concerned, however.

24 ". . . [B]oth lawyers and members of the public involved in or simply interested in the status of over 40,000
thousand silicon breast plant litigation cases in the United States can access case information via the World Wide
Web at &lt;http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/mdl926.htm&gt;." Fredric I. Lederer, The Courtroom As a Stop On the
Information Superhighway, 4 Aust. J. L. Reform 71(1997).
25 Jeff Feeley, Delaware Moves to Put Court Online, Data base to provide access to key corporate findings, Nat'l
L.J. September 21, 1998 at B1.
26 Of course, at present few people can navigate the court without significant help, and all need court staff to
obtain most litigation documents.
27 Art Buchwald, TV Trials and Errors, Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1981 at E1.
28 Yukiyo, Ltd. v. Watanabe, 111 F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also Wendy R. Leibowitz, Lawyers and
Technology, When High-Tech Is Over the Top: Is a CD-ROM Brief Fair or Foul?, Nat'l L. J. Mar. 3, 1997, at B8.
29 E.g., Rodime P.C. v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 2023 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit is encouraging the submission of appellate briefs in CD-ROM form. Joanna
Glaser, Second Circuit Unveils Latest Courtroom Tech, N.Y. Law J., Nov. 10, 1997 at T4.
30 Subject to time constraints. Some years ago while visiting the Courtroom 21 Project's McGlothlin Courtroom
Justice O'Connor suggested that this type of interchange might impel a shift towards the far more relaxed time
rules customary in the British House of Lords.
31 During deliberation in the much-publicized trial of Louise Woodward, the au pair subsequently convicted for the
death of a child in her care, the jury asked to review the testimony of a key defense witness. The judge refused
because producing the transcript was a practical impossibility. The stenographers' record had not been
transcribed and transcribing the portion requested would have taken too long and interrupted deliberations of a
sequestered jury (the witness had testified for two days).
In responding to this issue in the defense motion for a new trial, the judge noted that not having contemporaneous
transcripts was the norm for that court and that the attorney could have ordered daily transcripts at the start of the
trial or presented the jurors "his own recollection" in closing argument. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 7
Mass.L.Rptr. 449 (1997). This event opened the door to discussions of real-time transcription and
contemporaneous records and to criticism of the court for not being technologically up-to-date, especially for such
a complex, high-profile case. See, Patricia Nealon, The Au Pair Case: The Judge Hears Appeals/Review of
Testimony, Boston Globe, Nov. 5, 1997 at A19.
In contrast, real-time transcription was used in the equally well-publicized trial of Ruthann Aron, the United States
Senate candidate who ultimately pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of contracting to kill her husband. Its
impact on the trial was obvious. Judge Paul McGuckian, who received a contemporaneous transcript on his laptop
computer as trial progressed, noted that the real-time feed allowed him to gauge his perception of testimony.
"Sometimes I'm not sure I understood what a witness said, . . . [T]his allows me to confirm or disabuse myself of
something." Candus Thompson, Instant Transcripts Transform Trials, Balt.Sun, Mar. 3, 1998 at 1B. The defense
attorneys noted that though real-time transcription is expensive, it ultimately saved the defense time and money:
time in note taking and preparation for cross-examination and money in being able to keep expert witnesses
abreast of developments without having to have them present in the courtroom. Id.
Setting aside the issue of who should be responsible for ensuring that an adequate record is produced and the
associated costs, it is apparent that court record technology can have an impact on the substance of a trial and
perhaps on the administration of justice.
32 But, as the audio cannot itself be searched, this provides only a small fraction of the capability that would be
found in a court report's electronic transcript.
33 By their nature, video records display the very matters ordinarily invisible to written transcripts: body
movements, facial gestures, vocal intonations, and the like. These movements may prove essential to

understanding the impact of information not reflected on the written record. In one well-known case, the judge
apparently expressed his disbelief at the alibi testimony of a witness by shaking his head and silently turning his
chair away from the jury. Such extremes are not necessary to raise the question of silent judicial
communication.64 Every time the judge makes a movement--each time she knits her brow, yawns, rolls her eyes,
scratches her head--it is at some level interpreted as a commentary on the testimony of the witness. That
commentary becomes particularly intense because it is, in the main, subliminal.
Fredric I. Lederer, Technology Comes To the Courtroom, and . . . 43 Emory L.J. 1095, 112 (1994) (citing at note
64, State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Mo. 1971), and at note 65, LaDoris H. Cordell &amp; Florence O.
Keller, Pay No Attention to the Woman Behind the Bench: Musings of a Trial Court Judge, 68 IND. L.J. 1199,
1206 (1993).
34 Ky. R. Civ. P. 98. Kentucky adopted widespread use of video records after it experienced difficulty with
inadequate court reporter coverage, untimely transcripts, and excessive transcript charges. Harvard University
Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Court Reporting in Kentucky (A) (C16-91-1035.0 1990).
35 See , e.g., Rorie Sherman, Virtual Venues, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 1994, at 1, 30. In part because they were timeconsuming and cumbersome, the United States Judicial Conference recommended against use of videotaped
records alone. Courts have sometimes tried to choose between reporter and recorder based systems. In most
circumstances this is a false dichotomy. No known recording system can yield a transcript as quickly and
efficiently as can a competent court reporter using real-time transcription. However, ordinarily transcripts are
needed for court purposes only for read-backs of testimony during trial, preparation of jury instruction (or verdict
consideration in a bench trial), or preparation of an appellate transcript. In courts or cases in which there are few
read-backs or appeals, electronic recording is a highly cost-effective solution. As most courts have a mixture of
cases, however, they ought to have an administrative structure that permits skilled court record managers to
decide on the most appropriate type of record to be made on a case specific basis. At the same time, it would be
extraordinarily insular to fail to note that the lawyers and parties in cases have interests distinct from the courts.
Lawyers often want rapid transcript delivery to prepare for witness examination as for preparation of closing
arguments and jury instructions. Further, lawyers frequently need a usable transcript to decide whether to appeal.
At the very least, this dictates the need for rapid and accurate transcription when electronic recording is used.
36 Second and third generation DVD storage may be the breakthrough necessary to make this record financially
feasible.
37 As removable electronic storage media increase in size, video will be added.
38 E.g., Fed. Civ. P 52. See also Junda Woo, Use of Trial Videotapes Is Giving New Dimension to Appellate
Cases, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1992, at B1, B10.
39 If nothing else, one must wonder how an appellate court would respond to a more complete rendition of the
proceedings below. Given sound and video, we must assume that the court might well be more engaged in
appellate review. Yet, what, if anything, would be lost compared to review of written transcript, and what would
really be gained. "Conscientious and competent judges are best supported by accurate trial records. The more
accurate the record, the less likely that the case will be reversed. Indeed, one study by the National Center for
State Courts has determined that comprehensive video records increase appellate affirmances." Fredric I.
Lederer, Courtroom Technology From the Judges' Perspective Court Review, August, 1998, citing James A.
Maher, National Center for State Courts, Do Video Transcripts Affect the Scope of Appellate Review? An
Evaluation in the Kentucky Court of Appeals (1990).
40 Smell and touch cannot easily be recorded during trial. On the other hand, it is a rare appeal that might
implicate those senses.
41 To this might be added demeanor evidence -- how the fact finder perceives a witness while testifying.
42 Netting the Paper Deluge, Australian Law Inst. J. 1-2 (May, 1997)
43 In their simplest use, a high technology whiteboard transmits writing to monitors fed from the connected
computer, in the same color as that used on the board. The writing on the board can be preserved both by saving

the image to disk on the attached computer and by printing it on a connected printer. One of the great advantages
of the board is that once an image is saved to the computer it can be restored immediately even if the image has
been erased in whole or part. Whiteboards can be especially effective for witness drawings or counsel's opening
statement and closing argument.
Fredric I. Lederer, Excerpts from An Integrated Approach To Basic Technologically Based Advocacy and Litigation
27 (August, 1998 Working Edition)..
44 Id. at 26.
45 Fredric I Lederer, Some Thoughts On the Evidentiary Aspects of Technologically Presented Or Produced
Evidence., __ Southwestern L. Rev. _ (1998)(in press).
46 Of course, the presence of the original paper is a check on the possibility that the electronic image has been
electronically altered. Although of potential importance, this does not appear critical when speaking of either the
fact finder's usual perception or the ability to transmit the image electronically.
47 See also The Honorable Deborah K. Chasanow, Juror Survey, III ABA Techshow 98 163 (Chicago, Ill. Mar. 28,
1998).
48 Courtroom Technology draws Positive Response, The Third Branch 1, 3 (Aug. 1998)
&lt;http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/aug98ttb/crttech.html&gt;.
49 See, Angela Simoneaux, Wheels of Justice Grinding Faster With Aid of Computer Technology, Baton Rouge
Advoc., Jun. 1, 1997, at 1A (Judge Donald Walter on courtroom technology "[I]t's just a better way. It's a heck of a
lot better for the fact-finder."); Jan Ackerman, Lawyers Are Going High Tech, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Sept. 20, 1998 at
B1 (Judge Robert J. Cindrich on courtroom technology "I see it as an attempt to increase jury comprehension and
decrease the length of trials."); Howard Mintz, Judges Unveil High-Tech Gadgetry, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, May
17, 1998 at 15 (Judge James Ware on courtroom technology "Jurors have come to expect that technology in the
[Silicon] valley will be used. They like that - they believe in it."); Samar Abuhlhassan, Electronic Courtroom
Galvanizes Lawyers, Jurors, Austin Amer.-Statesman, Jul. 5, 1998 at A18 (Judge Thomas Hogan notes that jurors
are allowed "greater scrutiny of evidence" in his high tech courtroom and the chief deputy for court administration
notes that "We have fewer jurors sleeping."); Catherine Trevison, Judge Gets High-Tech Sidekick, TennesseanNashville, Mar. 18, 1998 at 3B (Judge Robert Echols on courtroom technology "I'm moving out of the 17th
century. It's just a way to make presentation of evidence clearer to the jury, speed the trial, and hopefully be much
more efficient."); Toni Locy, Law Meets Technology In Courtroom No. 9, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1997 at J01 (juror
Linda Hinnant on technology in Judge Hogan's courtroom "We got to see the evidence while they were talking
about it. It gave us more time to know what they were talking about at the same time they were making the
statement and asking the questions. It made you feel like you were a part of it."); and Doris Wong, 9 Comp.
Counsel 22, 23 (1993)(Judge Carl Rubin explains the benefit of video evidence display for juror comprehension
and recounts how one juror told him that jurors may feel embarrassed to take the time they need to read a
document that is handed to them and may quickly pass it to the next juror to avoid being the center of attention or
consuming too much time.).
50 Of course this presupposes that counsel personally is responsible for handling evidence presentation, the
favored Courtroom 21 approach. If counsel is dependent upon a technical support team, counsel will lose this
advantage as well as the spontaneity that is available to the attorney who can personally adjust to changed
circumstances.
51 Fredric I Lederer, Some Thoughts On the Evidentiary Aspects of Technologically Presented Or Produced
Evidence., __ Southwestern L. Rev. _ (1998)(in press).
52 In United States v. Kaczynski, 1997 WL 567038 (E.D. Cal.)(CR-5-96-259GEB)(the Unabomber case) defense
counsel sought unsuccessfully to prohibit electronic images of the paper evidence. The trial judge held that the
electronic evidence display system would not be "different from evidence mediums customarily used in court."
Order, U.S. v. Kaczynski, 1997 WL 583561 (E.D. Cal.)(CR-5-96-259GEB) .
53 IPIX produces a 360 degree photograph which can be rotated about the center point. To the types of evidence

one could also add the electronic annotations placed on images by witnesses, as in drawing a colored "x" on an
intersection graphic to show where a collision occurred.
54 Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).
55 Though a new group of experts, software forensics consultants, have emerged who can detect forgeries in
electronic evidence. See Wendy Leibowitz, E-Evidence Demands New Experts, Natl. L.J., Mar. 9, 1998 at A1.
56 See, e.g., Md. R. Civ. P. 2-504.3, Computer-Generated Evidence and Material (adopted Feb., 1998)..
57 E.g., Corel Presentations or Microsoft Powerpoint.
58 To be effective, however, counsel should use relatively few slides and forego any images that are not critically
and inherently useful.
59 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Video Depositions, Transcripts and Trials, 43 Emory L.J. 1071, 1072 (1994).
60 Id. at 1082; See generally McCrystal &amp; Maschari, Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness Stand?, 11
U. Tol. L. Rev. 239 (1980). See also Diane M. Hartmus, Videotrials, 23 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 1 (1996);
61 An Illinois court conducted videophone bail hearings in 1972 and a court in Philadelphia installed a closedcircuit television system to conduct preliminary arraignments in 1974. National Center for State Courts Briefing
Paper. Videoconferencing, &lt;http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSC/briefing/vc.htm&gt; visited March 30, 1998). Although
first appearances and arraignments can be combined they are ordinarily separate procedural stages. Remote
arraignments have existed since at least 1982 when Dade County, Florida, began to use two way television for
misdemeanor cases. Jeffrey M. Silbert, Una Hutton Newman &amp; Laurel Kalser, Telecommunications in the
Courtroom: The Use of Closed Circuit Television for Conducting Misdemeanor Arraignments in Dade County,
Florida, 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 657 (1984).
Courtroom 21 Report for Performance Engineering Corporation and the Electronic Courtroom Project of the
Administrative Office of The United States Courts, Legal and Technical Issues Associated With Courtroom
Technology n. 1 (April 22, 1998).
62 George Lange III and Lewis M. Smoley, 2d Circuit Is Now First Wired for Video-Argument. The Nat'l Law
Journal, June 9, 1997.
63 Needing access to at least satellite uplinks.
64 Fredric I Lederer, Some Thoughts On the Evidentiary Aspects of Technologically Presented Or Produced
Evidence., __ Southwestern L. Rev. _ (1998)(in press).
65 The Courtroom 21 Project uses six-channel, 384 h.320 Tandberg and Intertel videoconferencing. A lesser
bandwidth will degrade the connection.
66 Victoria Evidence (Audio Visual and Audio Linking) Act 1997 § 3 (Act No. 4/1997, Victoria, Australia) inserting
into the Evidence Act 1958, new Section 42G.
67 Thirty-four U.S. District Courts (encompassing sixty actual sites) use videoconferencing for prisoner civil rights
pretrial proceedings. This use was authorized by the Judicial Conference in 1996 and anticipated the 1996 Prison
Litigation Reform Act which required the federal courts to make use of videoconferencing technology in pretrial
proceedings. Currently, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits use
videoconferencing for oral arguments. Videoconferencing Links Federal Courts and Public, The Third Branch 2,
10 (June 1998) &lt;http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun98ttb/video.html&gt;.
68 Chief Justice M.E.J. Black, A Court-Based National Videoconferencing Network for Taking Evidence and
Aiding in Administration, presentation during The First Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conference (May 29,

1995).
69 Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
70 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853-54 (1990)
71 Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1998); cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. 1998).
72 Id. at 1370 citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 at 849-51.
73 Id. at 1370-72.
74 67 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. 1998).
75 Statutory authorization exists in many states. See, e.g., VA. Code Ann. § 19.2-3.1 (Michie Supp. 1994).
76 As of 1997 nineteen federal district courts were using videoconferencing for prisoner civil pre-trial hearings.
George Lange III and Lewis M. Smoley, 2d Circuit Is Now First Wired for Video-Argument. The Nat'l Law Journal,
June 9, 1997. There are now at least sixty separate installations. Videoconferencing Links Federal Courts and
Public, The Third Branch 2, 10 (June 1998) &lt;http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun98ttb/video.html&gt;. The benefits to
the system are obvious: time saved in travel, easier scheduling, and fewer security risks associated with
transporting and monitoring prisoners. Less obvious is the benefit that may come to prisoners from
videoconferenced pretrial proceedings. In geographically remote areas, prisoners may actually have a hearing
scheduled sooner and may get a more personal hearing via videoconferencing than they would if they appeared
in person in front of the judge. U.S. District Court Judge Fred Biery from the Western District of Texas notes that
most of the felony defendants in that district were handled in a courthouse where there was no full-time judge and
the defendants were bused from all over the district. The sentencing hearings were held once a month and fifty to
sixty sentencings were handled that day, as Judge Biery notes "These weren't complicated cases. But it was very
impersonal." Now the court handles eight to ten sentencings each Thursday:
We do them individually and we give them the attention I think they deserve. The majority of the defendants don't
speak English, so we use a translator. I think with the videoconferencing the defendant has a better perspective
on what is happening. Wit the cameras, it's like they are sitting six feet away. There is a one-on-one relationship
that just wasn't possible before.
Videoconferencing Links Federal Courts and Public, The Third Branch 2, 10 (June 1998)
&lt;http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun98ttb/video.html&gt;. Videoconferencing is used in many federal bankruptcy
courts for a wide range of matters and is of particular benefit because of the many hearings that are required by
federal bankruptcy law. Pilot projects have been undertaken in Florida, Texas, and Iowa. Id.
77 Many of the district courts that installed video equipment for prisoner suits are also using their
videoconferencing capability to hear witness testimony in trials. Videoconferencing Links Federal Courts and
Public, The Third Branch 2, 10 (June 1998) &lt;http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun98ttb/video.html&gt;.
78 Scott Marshall, Gwinnett Police Go On Line for Warrants; Video Testimony Speeds Arrests; May Not Be Legal,
Atlanta J. and Constitution, April 12, 1995.
79 The tenth and D.C. Circuits also used videoconferencing for remote appearances. Videoconferencing Links
Federal Courts and Public, The Third Branch 2, 10 (June 1998)
&lt;http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun98ttb/video.html&gt;.
80 Robin Topping, Hearings Linked By Videoconferencing, Newsday, Apr. 23, 1997 at A29; Mark Pazniokas,
Video Justice Is Catching On In Legal Circles, Hartford Courant, May 7, 1997 at A3.
81 Joanna Glaser, Second Circuit Unveils Latest Courtroom Tech, N.Y. Law J., Nov. 10, 1997 at T4.

82 As reported at the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Conference, Melbourne, Australia, March 23,
1998.
83 44 M.J. 464 (Armed F. 1996).
84 971 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. New York 1997)(noting the witness' illness as preventing a court appearance and the
safety risk a deposition would pose to his placement in the witness protection program).
85. Letter from Judge Anthony J. Sciuto to Counsel in Turcinovic v. Floch et al., No. BER-L-16422-90 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1997) (Jan. 6, 1998)(on file with author). See also Christopher Mumma, Paralyzed Man to Testify Using
Internet Link, Record (N.N.J.), Jan. 9, 1998 at L03.
86. Judge William Mauer's courtroom in Kansas City, Missouri has been high tech for a few years (document
camera, computer evidence presentation system, enabled for videoconferencing). Now the courtroom will also
double as a virtual classroom: additional cameras are being installed to allow broadcast of trials over the Internet
for viewing by law school classes. Interview of Judge William Mauer and clerk, by Susan Hobbs on Oct. 26, 1998.
87. Telephone interview with Judge Wilson by Susan Hobbs on Oct. 27, 1998.
88. Harrell v. State. at 1372.
89. Like practitioners, law students also are time demand adverse. If they perceive that technology use, such as
preparation of a computer slide show, will take time not necessary for a traditional presentation we can assume
that most will forego the opportunity when they do not see visible gain resulting.
90. During a Courtroom 21 Project senior staff meeting, October 29, 1998.
91. We must also distinguish between a lawyer's willingness to personally use the technology and the lawyer's
desire to have staff sit in the courtroom and do so. We believe that the first is far preferable to the second, but that
requires a high level of self-confidence on the part of the lawyer.
92. See note ? supra.
93. There seems little chance that today's technology augmented litigation would be so efficient as to cause such
a problem. The same might not be as true for a truly virtual system.
94. The Courtroom 21 experience is that normal courtroom equipment seldom fails. Networks can be perennial
problems, however.
95. Lawyers operate the evidence presentation equipment under judicial control.
96. Science Applications International Corp. v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 337 (Ct.
App. 1995). Specifically, the Court allowed recovery of expenses for a "graphics exhibit board" ($57,969) and an
evidence video ($101,908) but not for: document control and a case management database ($200,000), the
production of laser disks for evidence storage ($47,481), rental of graphics communications system equipment for
trial use ($9,916), fees for an on-site computer technician during trial ($11,983), and fees for editing video
depositions for better jury presentation ($35,652).
97. Id. at 338. The court went on to criticize the use of technology in this case, pointing out that the prevailing party
was awarded damages of $1 million but had litigation costs of $2 million, and concluding that: "[i]f a party litigant
chooses unwisely to expend monies in trial presentation in excess of the value of the case, utilizing advanced
methods of information storage, retrieval, and display, when more conventional if less impressive methods are
available, the party must stand his own costs." Id.
98. Mark Rollenhagen, A Courtroom Revolution, Plain Dealer (Clev.), Sept. 21, 1998 at B1.

99. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in criminal cases the defense is permitted to use technology owned or
rented by the prosecution. The situation in civil cases is far less clear.
100 Fredric I. Lederer, Courtroom Technology and Its Educational Implications, 8 VA Educ. &amp; Practice 3,
1998.
101. Joan Jacobson, High Tech Justice For All?, Balt. Sun, June 8, 1998 at 1C.
102. See note 25 supra.
103. Of course, most cases never make it to trial. One can reasonably argue that the primary function of courts is
to impel pretrial settlement on pain of possible trial.
104. Notwithstanding distrust of the system in some population groups.
105. As to probability and the courts generally, see, e.g. P. Tillers &amp; E. Green, Probability and Inference in
the Law of Evidence (1988).
106. Other than expressed satisfaction with the technology during Courtroom 21 Project experimental lab trials.
107. And audio.
108. Daniel E. Harmon, Panelists' Wake-Up Call: Future Is Here For Lawyers, 24 Law PC 1, 1995, reporting on
Johnson's presentation to the ABA Tech Show '95.
109. There is also, of course, a compelling Sixth Amendment argument that in criminal cases government
testimony without demeanor would fail the "confrontation" requirement of the Bill of Rights. Notwithstanding this,
this assumption should be tested scientifically.
110. Kevin Maney, Virtual Spelunkers' Reality, Business World Exploring CAVEs, USA Today, November 3, 1998,
at B-1, Col.3.
111. Id. at B-2, Col. 1.
112. Courthouses too could be made virtual, but a number of courthouse features would lend themselves to
physical location. If nothing else jails and the like could easily handle certain additional functions.
113. E.g., Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
114. " Courtrooms contain every symbol of authority that a set designer could imagine . . . You wear a costume
identifying you as, if not quite divine, someone special..." James B. Simpson, Websters' II New Riverside Desk
Quotations 74 (1992) (Judge Irving R. Kaufman, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Time,
May 5, 1980).
115. David S. Shrager &amp; Elizabeth Frost (ed.) The Quotable Lawyer 65 (1986) (quoting William T. Gossett,
President, American Bar Association in a speech to the Canadian Bar Association in Ottawa, September 3, 1969).
116. James B. Simpson, Websters' II New Riverside Desk Quotations 73 (1992) (quoting Learned Hand, To New
York Legal Aid Society, February 16, 1951).
117. And then wait their turn, often a lengthy time.
118. C.f., Bob Van Voris, 1998 Juror Outlook Survey, Civil Cases Jurors Do Not Trust Civil Litigants. Period., Nat'l
L.J., November 2, 1998, at A24 ("More than three-quarters [of surveyed persons] agreed with the statement,

'Whatever a judge said the law is, jurors do what they believe is the right thing.'").
119. Elements of this perception are now threatened by suspicions of racially based unfairness. See, e.g., Bob
Van Voris, 1998 Juror Outlook Survey, Criminal Cases Poll Elicits Fear of Rogue Jury. Period, Nat'l L.J.,
November 2, 1998, at A25 ("Almost one-third of the potential jurors polled don't believe police testimony, with
more than half of the blacks and Hispanics saying police usually don't tell the truth under oath"; "As a whole, 43
percent [of those surveyed] said that the system treats minorities unfairly).
120. David S. Shrager &amp; Elizabeth Frost (ed.) The Quotable Lawyer 66 (1986) (quoting Warren E. Burger,
address to the American Bar Association meeting in New Orleans as reported in the Los Angeles Times, August
27, 1978).
121. Harrell v. State, 709 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1998); cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. 1998).
122. Judge Donald Walter, United States District Judge in Shreveport, Louisiana has reported to William &amp;
Mary Law School's Legal Technology Seminar in March, 1998, that the use of a large wall-mounted screen to
display all case evidence resulted in a report to him by a local journalist that she could understand what was really
happening at trial for the first time.
123. Much of expert witness testimony may become remote in an effort to reduce litigation costs.

Biographical Information
This biographical information may date from as far back as 1999. Please keep in mind that it may no longer be accurate.
Fredric I. Lederer
Frederic Lederer is chancellor professor of law at the College of William & Mary's School of Law and founder and
director of the Courtroom 21 Project, which includes the world's most technologically advanced trial and appellate
courtroom. Prior to joining the William & Mary faculty, Mr. Lederer served as a member of the United States Army's
Judge Advocate General's Corps. He also has served as prosecutor, defense counsel and trial judge. Mr. Lederer's
areas of specialization include evidence, trial practice, criminal procedure, military law and legal technology. He has
written numerous books and articles as well as two law-related educational television series.
Chancellor Professor of Law and Director
Courtroom 21 Project
William & Mary School of Law
Williamsburg, Virginia
Phone: (757) 221-3792
Fax: (757) 221-3261
E-mail: filede@mail.wm.edu

